An examination of validation practices in relation to the forensic acquisition of digital evidence in South Africa by Jordaan, Jason
AN EXAMINATION OF VALIDATION PRACTICES IN RELATION 
TO THE FORENSIC ACQUISITION OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requ irements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Of 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
by 
JASON JORDAAN 
January 2014 
ABSTRACT 
The acquisition of digital evidence is the most crucial part of the entire digital forensics process. 
During this process, digital evidence is acquired in a forensically sound manner to ensure the legal 
admissibility and reliability of that evidence in court. In the acquisition process various hardware or 
software tools are used to acquire the digital evidence. All of the digital forensic standards relating 
to the acquisition of digital evidence require that the hardware and software tools used in the 
acquisition process are validated as functioning correctly and reliably, as this lends credibility to the 
evidence in court. In fact the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 in South 
Africa specifically requires courts to consider issues such as reliability and the manner in which the 
integrity of digital evidence is ensured when assessing the evidential weight of digital evidence. 
Previous research into quality assurance in the practice of digital forensics in South Africa identified 
that in general, tool validation was not performed, and as such a hypothesis was proposed that 
digital forensic practitioners in South Africa make use of hardware and/or software tools for the 
forensic acquisition of digital evidence, whose validity and/or reliability cannot be objectively proven. 
As such the reliability of any digital evidence preserved using those tools is potentially unreliable. 
This hypothesis was tested in the research through the use of a survey of digital forensic 
practitioners in South Africa. 
The research established that the majority of digital forensic practitioners do not use tools in the 
forensic acquisition of digital evidence that can be proven to be validated and/or reliable. While just 
under a fifth of digital forensic practitioners can provide some proof of validation and/or reliabi lity, 
the proof of validation does not meet formal international standards. In essence this means that 
digital evidence, which is preserved through the use of specific hardware and/or software tools for 
subsequent presentation and reliance upon as evidence in a court of law, is preserved by tools 
where the objective and scientific validity thereof has not been determined. Since South African 
courts must consider reliability in terms of Section 15(3) of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 in assessing the weight of digital evidence, this is undermined through 
the current state of practice in South Africa by digital forensic practitioners. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital evidence is a fundamental and integral part of almost all investigations 
conducted presently; these investigations are not limited to suspected criminal 
offences, but also include civil investigations and regulatory investigations. In terms of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (Republic of South 
Africa, 2002). a key consideration of the courts when looking at digital evidence is 
reliability of the digital evidence and how the integrity thereof was maintained. Digital 
forensics is a key discipline used to address this. 
Digital forensics is the forensic science discipline that combines various methods from 
science, technology, and engineering, to acquire and interpret the data stored on digital 
devices to answer questions in a court of law. While initially focused on cases destined 
for the courtroom, digital forensics has been used in other applications such as pure 
and applied research, policy enforcement, information security incident response, and 
even intelligence gathering (Kessler, 2012). 
1.1. MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
A digital forensic practitioner has a responsibility to accurately report on their actions 
taken to identify, extract, and analyse the data that will be presented as evidence in 
court. Many digital forensic practitioners rely on hardware and software tools to 
produce results, often without knowledge of how those results are produced, which 
risks not only their professional reputations, but also the potential successful outcome 
of the investigation they have worked on (Marcella & Guillossou, 2012). 
One of the crucial elements of the entire digital forensics process is that digital forensic 
practitioners should have detailed knowledge of the capabilities, limitations, and 
restrictions of the tools they use (Casey & Rose, 2010). One of the significant challenges 
faced by digital forensic practitioners is how to assure the reliability of the forensic tools 
they use, especially as a result of the reliance that is often placed on these tools by 
digital forensic practitioners (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
Very little research has been done on the validation and verification of digita l forensic 
tools and digital evidence (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
The acquisition of digital evidence in a forensically sound and valid manner is one of the 
most critical phases in the digital forensics process; if there are shortcomings in this 
process, there is a critical risk of the evidence itself being declared inadmissible in court. 
The evidence acquisition process requires that the source media containing the digita l 
evidence must be duplicated bit by bit, ensuring that all the data is duplicated, and that 
the duplication process itself does not alter the data in any way. Various hardware and 
software tools are used during this process, and it is crucial that all tools and 
instruments used in any forensic science process actually perform their functions 
correctly and accurately. Forensic science, therefore, relies on validation, verification, 
and calibration testing processes to ensure that the tools used are functioning within 
acceptable standards. 
Previous research into quality assurance practices in digital forensics in South Africa 
(Jordaan, 2012) identified tool validation as a general area of concern. In terms of the 
forensic acquisition of digital evidence, if the tools used to preserve the evidence were 
not proven to be valid, then the admissibility and weight of the digital evidence could 
be significantly affected. 
Considering the use of digital evidence in court, it is thus important to identify the 
current state of practice in this regard to identify any shortcomings or risks in the use of 
digital evidence as a legitimate form of evidence in South African courts of law. 
1.2. HYPOTHESIS 
The core hypothesis of the research, based on the observations of the researcher, is 
that digital forensic practitioners in South Africa make use of hardware and/or software 
tools for the forensic acquisition of digital evidence, whose validity and/or reliability 
cannot be objectively proven. As such the reliability of any digital evidence preserved 
using those tools is potentially unreliable. 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research makes use of a structured questionnaire to collect both quantitative and 
qualitative data from South African digital forensic practitioners for analysis, as detailed 
in the Research Design chapter. 
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1.3.1. Research Objectives 
The literature review guided the formalisation of the research objectives. Research 
objectives demonstrate a clear sense of purpose and direction, and lead to greater 
specificity (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). The research objectives for this research 
were: 
• To determine the current state of practice with regards the validation testing of 
hardware and/or software tools used in the forensic acquisition process amongst 
South African digital forensic practitioners. 
• To identify shortcomings and deficiencies (if any) in the use of hardware and/or 
software tools used during the forensic acquisition process, relating to the 
reliability of the tools used, and the impact this could have on the reliability of 
digital evidence in court proceedings. 
• To identify possible reasons for any shortcomings and deficiencies (if any) in use 
of hardware and/or software tools used during the forensic acquisition process, 
relating to the reliability of the tools used. 
1.3.2. Research Questions 
The clearly defined research objectives, which are critical in the research process 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009), allowed specific and clearly defined research 
questions to be set out. The following research questions were addressed in this 
research: 
• How do digital forensic practitioners satisfy themselves that the hardware and/or 
software tools used in the forensic acquisition of digital evidence are reliable? 
• To what extent are the hardware and/or software tools used in the forensic 
acquisition of digital evidence validated as being reliable? 
• What are the accepted standards for ensuring that the hardware and/ or software 
tools used in the forensic acquisition of digital evidence are reliable? 
• Do South African digital forensic practitioners comply with these standards? 
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• What training have South African digital forensic practitioners undertaken that 
has identified the importance of validation and how to conduct validation 
testing? 
• To what extent has potentially unreliable digital evidence been used in court 
proceedings as a result of potentially unreliable hardware and/or software tools 
used in the forensic acquisition process? 
By answering these questions, the research has identified shortcomings in current 
practice. 
1.3.3. Limitations of the Research 
Owing to practical issues such as the nature of the research and the time ava ilable to 
conduct the research, the research was limited in the following respects : 
• The curricula of the various training courses and academic programs were not 
examined in detail to determine either the quality of any material covered relating 
to the importance of validation testing of tools used in the forensic acquisition 
process, or the quality of any material addressing how to conduct validation testing 
of forensic acquisition tools. 
• In examining the sample participants' knowledge of formal validation testing 
standards, their actual knowledge was not specifically tested. 
• The exact size of the population of digital forensic practitioners in South Africa is 
not known. As a result, the sample size needed to ensure that the sample is 
statistically representative so that generalisations can be made with regard to the 
entire population of digital forensic practitioners in South Africa, could not be 
accurately determined. 
1.4. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is organised into six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the 
research topic. The second chapter details the literature review conducted as part of 
the research. The third and fourth chapters detail the research design and how the 
research was implemented. The fifth chapter presents the research findings and the 
sixth chapter the conclusions from the research. 
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1.5. SUMMARY 
Digital evidence is now a crucial element in proving many criminal cases, as well as used 
in civil trials. Judges and magistrates make their decisions based on the reliable and 
admissible evidence that is placed before them. The core hypothesis of the research is 
that digital forensic practitioners in South Africa make use of hardware and/or software 
tools for the forensic acquisition of digital evidence, whose validity and/or reliability 
cannot be objectively proven. As such the reliability of any digital evidence preserved 
using those tools is potentially unreliable. In other words Judges and magistrates are 
potentially making decisions based on evidence that itself may be fundamentally 
unreliable. 
The research will address a number of issues. It will determine the current state of 
practice with regards the validation testing of hardware and/or software tools used in 
the forensic acquisition process amongst South African digital forensic practitioners. It 
will identify shortcomings and deficiencies {if any) in the use of hardware and/or 
software tools used during the forensic acquisition process, relating to the reliability of 
the tools used, and the impact this could have on the reliability of digital evidence in 
court proceedings. Finally it will identify possible reasons for any shortcomings and 
deficiencies (if any) in use of hardware and/or software tools used during the forensic 
acquisition process, relating to the reliability of the tools used. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of the research was to examine the current validation practices in relation 
to the forensic acquisition phase of the digital forensics process in South Africa, and to 
determine the possible reasons for these practices. The research also aimed to 
determine any problem areas that could negatively impact the practice of digital 
forensics in South Africa, and undermine the value that courts may place on digital 
evidence in legal proceedings. 
This literature review explores a number of topics related to the research. It explores 
the concept of digital evidence, including its definition, characteristics, and legalities, in 
so far as it relates to court proceedings. The concept of digital forensics, which is 
intrinsically linked to digital evidence, is then examined in depth, including the 
importance of quality assurance in digital forensics and some of the general quality 
assurance problems typically encountered. The forensic acquisition process is then 
considered in detail as part of the overall digital forensics process, focusing on write 
blocking and forensic imaging, the importance of validation practices in these, and the 
general quality assurance practices that apply in the forensic acquisition process. The 
literature review finally examines existing validation standards and practices applicable 
to the forensic acquisition process. 
2.1. DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
Evidence is the material used by a court of law to reach a legal decision on any case 
brought before it for adjudication. The entire digital forensics process is interlinked with 
digital evidence, and as such it is important to examine the nature of digital evidence 
and the legal issues relating thereto. 
Evidence can be defined as anything that proves or disproves a fact at issue in a judicial 
case (Swanson, Chamelin, Territo, & Taylor, 2006). Digital evidence is considered 
information stored or transmitted in digital form that has probative legal value (Casey, 
2011). In other words, it is stored or transmitted reliable digital objects supporting or 
refuting a specific hypothesis (Carrier, 2005). 
Digital evidence can be used to answer typical investigative questions, proving either 
who, what, when, where, why, or how, of a matter under investigation (Solomon, 
Barrett, & Broom, 2005). 
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It can also answer some very specific questions such as what happened when, who 
interacted with whom, from where a particular digital object originated, and who was 
responsible for it (Casey & Rose, 2010). 
Digital evidence should be treated no differently than traditional physical evidence and 
while the methods used to collect and interpret it may appear complicated and 
expensive, when they are used correctly they produce evidence that is both compelling 
and cost-effective (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2007). Like any other type of 
physical evidence, the improper handling or forensic processing of digital evidence, can 
destroy its court value (Swanson, Chamelin, Territo, & Taylor, 2006). 
Digital evidence is a very fragile form of evidence and can easily be altered, damaged, or 
destroyed by its improper handling or examination (Association of Chief Police Officers, 
2007). The nature of digital evidence means that there are a number of inherent 
challenges to its use in court, the most significant of which is the ease with which it can 
be manipulated or altered, either intentionally or accidental ly, without leaving any 
obvious signs that the data has been altered (Casey, 2011). 
2.1.1. Digital Evidence in Relation to South African Law 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 deals with digital 
evidence in South African law, and addresses how the courts should deal with digital 
evidence. Section 15(2) of this Act guides a court in how it should evaluate digital 
evidence, and one of the key issues that a court must consider is the reliabil ity of the 
digital evidence itself, and how the integrity of that evidence was maintained (Van Der 
Merwe, Roos, Pistorius, & Eiselen, 2008). 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 does not define digital 
evidence per se, but it does define a data message in Section 1: data is an electronic 
representation of information in any form, and a data message is any data that is 
generated, sent, received, or stored in electronic means (Republic of South Africa, 
2002). In essence a data message is synonymous with digital evidence, and satisfies the 
definitions of digital evidence given by Casey (2011) and Carrier (2005). 
Section 15 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 deals with 
the admissibility and weight of data messages. Section 15(1) of the Act states that a 
data message (and thus digital evidence) cannot be ruled inadmissible simply by virtue 
of the evidence being in an intangible digital format, while Section 15(2) goes on to 
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state that information in a digital form must be given due evidential weight (Republic of 
South Africa, 2002}. 
Section 15(3) lays down the issues that a court must consider in assessing the evidential 
weight of the digital evidence, and requires a court to do so (Republic of South Africa, 
2002) : 
• Consider the reliability of the manner in which the data message (digital 
evidence) was generated, stored, or communicated. 
• Consider reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message 
(digital evidence) was maintained. 
• Consider the manner in which the originator of the data message (digital 
evidence) was established. 
• Consider any other relevant factors. 
A key issue in demonstrating the reliability of the digital evidence is establishing a 
proper chain of evidence and establishing the reliability of the digital evidence using 
cryptographic means such as mathematical hashes (Van Der Merwe, Roos, Pistorius, & 
Eiselen, 2008}. 
2.1.2. Admissibility and Relevance of Digital Evidence 
For evidence to be useable in any court of law, it must be both relevant and admissible. 
If it does not satisfy both criteria, it cannot be considered by a court as it may unfairly 
prejudice one side or the other in the case. Even if it involves digital evidence, the 
traditional requirements of the law of evidence still apply. Relevant evidence is 
evidence that can prove or disprove any of the facts in the case. If evidence is not 
considered relevant it will not be considered in the case. Admissible evidence is 
evidence that meets all regulatory and statutory requirements, and has been correctly 
obtained and handled (Solomon, Barrett, & Broom, 2005}. 
A key aspect of establishing the admissibility and persuasive value of digital evidence in 
legal proceedings, whether they are criminal or civil, is to show to the court that the 
evidence obtained from the original media is a true and accurate representation of the 
original data (National Institute of Justice, 2007}. 
Evidence is either admissible or inadmissible for the purposes of court (Schwikkard & 
Van Der Merwe, 2002}. The two instances that generally cause evidence not be 
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admissible in court are to collect it in an illegal manner, or to modify the evidence after 
it has come into the possession of the investigator/examiner (Solomon, Barrett, & 
Broom, 2005). A typical mistake that leads to digital evidence being ruled inadmissible 
in court is that it was obtained without the correct legal authorisation (Casey, 2011). 
Other common mistakes that are made by digital forensic examiners, which can render 
digital evidence inadmissible, include (Jones & Valli, 2009): 
• Failure to create and maintain the proper documentation through all stages of 
the digital forensic process. 
• The inadvertent modification of digital evidence. 
• Failure to maintain the chain of custody. 
• Failure by a digital forensic examiner to know when s/he has reached the limits of 
his/her knowledge and ask for advice. 
In the United States, use is made of the Daubert criteria when evaluating the 
admissibility of expert scientific testimony, which would include digital evidence, 
obtained and presented by a digital forensics practitioner (National Research Council, 
2002). These criteria include: 
• Whether the theories or techniques used are based on a hypothesis that is 
testable. 
• Whether the theories or techniques used have been subjected to a peer review. 
• Whether there is a known or potential error rate ofthe techniques. 
• Whether the methods and techniques are generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community. 
2.1.3. Relationship between Digital Evidence and Digital Forensics 
Digital forensics is a critical component in bringing digital evidence to court, as the use 
of digital forensics follows certain standard processes and procedures, which tend to 
persuade the court to admit digital evidence and give due and proper evidential weigh 
to it (Van Der Merwe, Roos, Pistorius, & Eiselen, 2008). In assessing the weight of 
digital evidence in South African courts, digital forensics plays an increasingly important 
role {Meintjes-Van der Walt, 2012). A significant component of ensuring the 
admissibility of digital evidence is to show the court that the digital evidence produced 
in court is exactly the same as that which was initially seized (Association of Chief Police 
Officers, 2007). 
Four basic principles developed in the United Kingdom for computer-based digital 
evidence (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2007) are commonly used throughout the 
world. These are: 
• No action taken by an investigator or examiner should change data held on a 
computer or storage media that may subsequently be relied upon in court. 
• In circumstances where an investigator or examiner must access original data 
held on a computer or on storage media, that person must be competent to do 
so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and implications of their 
actions. 
• An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer-based digital 
evidence must be created and preserved, and it must be detailed enough to allow 
an independent third party to use the processes as documented, and achieve the 
same results by following those processes. 
• The person in charge of an investigation has the overall responsibility for ensuring 
that these principles are adhered to. 
The International Organisation on Digital Evidence also set a number of principles to 
ensure the integrity of digital evidence, including the fol lowing (McKemmish, 2008). 
• When dealing with digital evidence, all of the general procedural principles in the 
field of forensic science should be applied. 
• Once digital evidence has been acquired, no actions taken should change that 
evidence. 
• When it is necessary to interact directly with original digital evidence, the person 
doing so should be specifically trained to do so. 
• All activity relating to the seizure, access, storage, or transfer of digital evidence 
must be fully documented, and this documentation must be preserved and 
available for review. 
• A person in possession of digital evidence is responsible for all actions taken with 
respect to it when in their possession. 
• Any agency responsible for seizing, accessing, storing, or transferring digital 
evidence, is responsible for complying with these principles. 
Physical evidence is collected using very rigorous and established procedures in order to 
protect it from contamination or destruction, or from claims that it was tampered with 
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or handled improperly, and to establish and preserve the chain of custody. Digital 
evidence, just like physical evidence, must be subject to the same rigorous 
requirements, and by following established forensic science practices, this fragile and 
easily altered form of evidence can be shown to be authentic. Failure to follow these 
procedures could result in the digital evidence being excluded from a court of law, or at 
the very least being given limited evidential value (Jones & Valli, 2009). In many 
respects, digital evidence is simply another form of latent physical evidence, which must 
be handed with established forensic science principles (Casey, 2011). 
Digital forensic tools play a critical role in preserving and extracting digital evidence 
during the digital forensics process, and if the tools themselves function incorrectly, or 
not as intended, then there is a real risk that the resultant digita l evidence may be 
inadmissible in court proceedings. The trustworthiness of digital evidence is thus often 
interlinked and reliant on the correct functioning of the forensic tools used. To 
guarantee that digital evidence is sound, digital forensic practitioners must validate and 
verify their tools (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
2.2. DIGITAL FORENSICS 
Forensic science is crucial to the successful investigation of crime in the modern age, 
and is critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of the general criminal justice system 
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2005). 
Digital forensics is an emerging forensic science (Britz, 2009) that is playing an 
increasingly significant role in modern criminal and civil court actions. 
2.2.1. Defining Digital Forensics 
Digital forensics is at its most elementary the preservation, identification, extraction, 
and documentation of digital evidence stored as data or magnetically encoded 
information. In essence, digital forensics is about evidence from computers, digital 
media, or digital devices that can stand up to scrutiny in court. The objective of digital 
forensics is quite simple: to recover, analyse, and present digital evidence in such a way 
that it is usable as evidence in a court of law (Vacca, 2005). 
One definition of digital forensics is that it is the science of acquiring, preserving, 
retrieving, and presenting data that has been processed electronically and stored on 
computer media (Swanson, Chamelin, Territo, & Taylor, 2006). Digital forensics has also 
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been defined as computer investigation and analysis techniques that involve the 
identification, preservation, extraction, documentation, and interpretation of computer 
data to determine potential legal evidence (Solomon, Barrett, & Broom, 2005). Another 
definition is that digital forensics is the application of science and engineering to the 
legal problems associated with digital evidence (Jones & Valli, 2009). In another 
definition, digital forensics is the use of scientifically derived and proven methods 
towards the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, 
documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for 
the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events, or helping to 
anticipate unauthorised actions (McKemmish, 2008). 
Ken Zatyko, a former director of the Defence Computer Forensics Laboratory, which is 
one of the biggest digital forensics laboratories in the United States, defines digital 
forensic science as "the application of computer science and investigative procedures 
for a legal purpose involving the analysis of digital evidence (information of probative 
value that is stored or transmitted in binary form) after proper search authority, chain 
of custody, validation with mathematics (hash function), use of validated tools, 
repeatability, reporting, and possible expert presentation" (Zatyko, 2007). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, digital forensics is regarded as the forensically and 
scientifically valid preservation, examination and analysis of digital evidence, and the 
interpretation thereof to answer specific legal questions in a court of law. 
2.2.2. Digital Forensics as a Forensic Science Discipline 
Digital forensics did not start as a forensic science in a forensic laboratory; instead it 
developed as a result of law enforcement investigators who realised that computers 
may be sources of evidence in the early days of computing (National Research Council, 
2009). Digital forensics began as a specific discipline in the mid-1980s as federal law 
enforcement agencies in the United States saw the increasing involvement of 
computers in crimes (Jones & Valli, 2009). In the early 1990s, the International 
Association of Computer Investigative Specialists, which comprised law enforcement 
digital forensic investigators, created the first documented set of guidelines for digital 
forensics (Pollitt, 2008). 
Digital forensics initially developed in an ad-hoc manner, rather than a scientific one, 
but this has changed, and many of the current developments in digital forensics are 
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scientific in nature (Beckett & Slay, 2007). In the decade leading up to the publication of 
research by the National Research Council in 2009, what had up until then been an 
investigative methodology practiced by investigators with an interest and aptitude for 
computers, developed into a separate forensic science discipline subject to the rigors 
and expectations of the greater field of forensic science (National Research Council, 
2009). In 2003 digital forensics became part of mainstream forensic science when the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board 
recognised digital forensics as a ful ly-fledged forensic science discipline, and a discipline 
in which a forensic science laboratory could be accredited (Carrier, 2005). In 2009, the 
American Academy of Forensic Science adopted digital forensics as a science (Kessler, 
2012). 
Initial conceptual approaches to digital forensics were fragmented, which perpetuated 
the viewpoint that there was no standard approach to digital forensic practice. 
However, the development of common conceptual approaches was necessary for digital 
forensics to be considered a valid forensic science discipline (Rogers & Siegfried, 2004). 
Recent research supports the view of digital forensics as a forensic science, owing to the 
fundamental aspect of forensic science, which is the application of a scientific discipline 
to aspects ofthe law, and this is precisely what is done in digital forensic practice (Irons, 
Stephens, & Ferguson, 2009). 
Forensic science is an applied version of the foundation scientific discipline on which it 
is based, and so for example, forensic toxicology would be the application by a 
toxicologist of his/her scientific knowledge of toxicology to a legal application (Irons, 
Stephens, & Ferguson, 2009). Similarly, in a computing environment, digital forensics 
would be the application of scientific knowledge from the field of computer science to a 
legal application. This position is supported by other research, which compared the 
general discipline of forensic science to computer forensics (Hankins, Uehara, & Jigang, 
2009). 
2.2.3. Importance of Quality Assurance Practices in Digital Forensics 
In recent years, courts began to recognise digital forensics as a legitimate scientific 
method for proving facts that can be used to prove matters in a court of law. This 
emphasis on digital forensics as a forensic science is important in that it shows that 
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digital forensics is based on generally accepted scientific methods (Volonino, Anzaldua, 
& Godwin, 2007), including quality assurance practices. 
Quality assurance is a crucial aspect of digital forensics as a forensic science discipline, 
with the quality of the work done being considered the most important aspect (Fereday 
& Kopp, 2003) owing to the actual or potential consequences of poor quality. The work 
of a forensic practitioner plays out in a court of law, where defects in the forensic 
process can produce a flawed product, which can result in an innocent person being 
pun ished (having to pay either a fine, receive a prison sentence, or both), as well as 
having to wrongfully pay out money in a civil lawsuit, or even resulting in a person who 
actually committed the transgression going unpunished to transgress again. It is 
important that forensic evidence is correct as the consequences of mistakes can have a 
very real human cost, and in addition to that cost, pub lic confidence in the courts and 
justice system itself is damaged (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee, 2005). 
There is a fundamental legal and philosophical maxim that states that it is better for ten 
guilty people to go free rather than let one innocent person suffer. The innocent can 
most certainly suffer when there is poor quality in forensic science, and this can never 
be acceptable. To avoid this happening, the quality of forensic science examinations, 
including digital forensics, must be beyond reproach. 
In digital forensics, as in any forensic science, quality can be defined as a final product 
free of deficiencies, which means that the evidence can be tested and validated, and 
the results must be measurable and repeatable . Assurance is the process of validating, 
testing, or verifying that a specific process functions as intended, or as specified, and 
this is usually done through testing (Jones & Valli, 2009). 
Digital forensic science, as all forensic sciences, is considered by many to have its own 
intrinsic quality metric, namely, the evidence admitted into court and which stands up 
to vigorous cross examination {Jones & Valli, 2009). However, quality assurance can 
increase the likelihood that the evidence and the processes applied to it can 
successfully stand up to this vigorous cross examination. 
According to the National Academy of Science in the United States, quality assurance 
procedures are necessary in the practice of forensic science to identify mistakes, 
scientific fraud, and examiner bias, to confirm the continued validity and reliability of 
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forensic processes and to improve on processes that need to be improved (National 
Research Council, 2009). 
Two critical properties of digital evidence are the reliability and completeness of the 
evidence, and if either of these is questionable, the evidentiary value is compromised. 
Quality assurance can ensure that the evidence presented in court is both reliable and 
complete. To achieve this, a number of criteria should be established in relation to the 
digital evidence, namely, that (McKemmish, 2008): 
• the meaning and interpretation of the digital evidence has been unaffected by 
the digital forensic process used, 
• all potential errors have been reasonably identified and satisfactorily explained to 
remove any doubt over the reliability of the evidence, 
• the digital forensic process can be independently examined and verified in 
totality, 
• the digital forensic analysis of the evidence has been undertaken by a person with 
sufficient and relevant experience. 
If a digital forensic process is found to be questionable in court, in other words, not 
forensically sound, this will likely influence the admissibility of the weight of the digital 
evidence (Casey, 2011). Quality assurance can contribute to establishing the forensic 
soundness of a process. 
2.2.4. General Problems in Relation to Quality Assurance Practices in Digital Forensics 
In recent years, there has been significant interest in problems in forensic science. 
While some of the research is generalised to the broader field of forensic science, many 
of the same problems can be applicable to digital forensics as a specific discipline within 
the forensic science field. 
Recent research in the United States identified a number of problems with the practice 
of forensic science in that country. The research identified significant problems with 
quality assurance practices, which were necessary to ensure the accuracy of forensic 
analysis. As a result of poor or non-existent quality assurance practices, persons had 
been convicted of crimes that had not been committed (National Research Council, 
2009). 
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Research conducted on forensic science laboratories in California found that several 
laboratories had no comprehensive quality assurance systems in place. In fact, with 
respect to digital forensics, of the 32 forensic laboratories in the state of California, only 
one met the quality assurance standards for digital forensics as prescribed by the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board 
(California Crime Laboratory Review Task Force, 2009). 
The problems identified most often are attributed to quality assurance practices and 
issues that impact quality in general, such as time pressures and examiner competency. 
An additional problem is the current ability of law enforcement, who stil l comprise the 
main group of practitioners in the field of digital forensics, to apply scientific princip les 
to digital fo rensics (Beckett & Slay, 2007). 
The increase in requests for digital forensics support in investigations has had a 
significant impact on the workloads of digita l forensic practitioners, who experience 
significant backlogs. Accuracy is critical in digital forensics, as it is in any branch of 
forensic science, and as such shortcuts cannot be taken in an effort to save time (Vacca, 
2005). 
However, significant pressure can be brought to bear on forensic practitioners t o get 
the job done quickly. It is critical that the quality of digital forensic examinations be kept 
at a high level despite the work pressures, under which many digital forensic 
practitioners operate. This work pressure has resulted in examiners producing quick 
results, sometimes at the expense of reliability, accuracy, and even impartia lity 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, 2011). 
The need for continuing professional development for forensic practitioners to remain 
current and advance to an elevated level of expertise in their chosen discip line is crucia l. 
When forensic practitioners have not kept up-to-date through continuing professional 
development, their skills and knowledge become outdated, and as a result many 
forensic cases are flawed owing to a lack of training and contemporary knowledge 
(Swanson, Chamelin, Territo, & Taylor, 2006). The need for continuing professional 
development is especially critical in the field of digital forensics owing to t he rapid 
changes not only in technology, hardware, and software that must be examined and 
analysed by digital forensic examiners, but also in the rapid development of tools and 
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methodologies used in the digital forensic process itself, as well as in the legal 
landscape. 
Research conducted in South Africa focusing on quality assurance practices in digital 
forensics confirmed that these issues are also relevant in South Africa (Jordaan, 2012). 
2.3. THE DIGITAL FORENSICS PROCESS 
Digital forensics is fundamentally a methodology with a number of distinct stages or 
phases, which encompass various tasks that are performed by a digital forensics 
practitioner when dealing with potential digital evidence. The basic digital forensic 
methodology includes acquiring the data without altering or damaging the source of the 
data, authenticating that the data acquired is the same as that from the seized source, 
and analysing the data acquired without altering it (Sansurooah, 2006). 
A number of process models have developed, which define the various stages and 
phases comprising a high-level digital forensics methodology. 
2.3.1. Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) Model 
The first Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) held in Utica, New York in August 
2001 identified the need for a standard framework for digita l forensics, and proposed 
the following iterative process model consisting of a number of distinct phases: 
identification, preservation, collection, examination, analysis, presentation, and 
decision (Palmer, 2001): 
Figure 1 • DFRWS Digital Forensics Process 
2.3.2. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Model 
The National Institute of Justice of the United States Department of Justice documented 
a digital forensics process model consisting of preparation, recognition and 
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identification, scene documentation, collection and preservation, packaging and 
transportation, examination, analysis, and reporting (National Institute of Justice, 2001). 
Figure 2 - Nil Digital Forensics Process 
2.3.3. The Abstract Digital Forensics Model 
The abstract digital forensics model, consisting of identification, preparation, approach 
strategy, preservation, collection, examination, analysis, presentation, and returning 
evidence phases, built on the NU and DFRWS digital forensics process models (Reith, 
Carr, & Gunsch, 2002). 
Figure 3 - Abstract Digita l Forensics Process 
2.3.4. Hierarchical Objectives Based Framework Forensics Model 
Researchers from the University of Texas in San Antonio proposed a model, which 
consisted of a preparation phase, a data collection phase, a data analysis phase, a 
presentation of findings phase, and an incident closure phase (Beebe & Clark, 2005}. 
18 I P age 
2.3.5. 
2.3.6. 
Figure 4 - Hierarchical Objectives Based Framework Digital Forensics Process 
Digital Forensic Investigation Framework 
Researchers in Malaysia consolidated a number of existing digital forensics models into 
a digital forensic investigation framework, consisting of processes for preparation, 
collection and preservation, examination and analysis, presentation and reporti ng, and 
disseminating the case {Selamat, Yusof, & Sahib, 2008). 
Figure 5- Digital Forensic Investigation Framework Forensics Process 
Casey Model 
Eoghan Casey, a prominent digital forensic academic and practitioner, proposed a 
model of the digital forensic process, which includes authorisation and preparation, 
identification, collection and preservation, examination and analysis, reconstruct ion, 
and reporting results {Casey , 2011). 
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Figure 6- The Casey Digital Forensics Process 
2.3.7. Harmonised Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model 
Extensive research has been carried out recently at the University of Pretoria {UP) on a 
harmonised digital forensic investigation process model, which is an iterative and multi-
tiered model that introduces parallel actions to many of the traditional digital forensics 
processes (Valjarevic & Venter, 2012). 
The primary processes include incident detection, first response, planning, preparation, 
incident scene documentation and potential evidence identification, potential evidence 
collection, potential evidence transportation, potential evidence analysis, presentation 
and conclusion (Valjarevic & Venter, 2012). 
A number of parallel actions then take place alongside these processes and include 
obtaining authorisation, documentation, information flow, preserving chain of custody, 
preserving evidence, and interaction with physical investigation (Valjarevic & Venter, 
2012). 
This model forms the basis for the ISO 27043 Draft International Standard Information 
Technology-Security Techniques-Incident Investigation Principles and Processes1. 
1 http://www .iso.org/iso/iso _catalogue/ catalogue_ tc/ catalogue_ detail.htm ?csnum ber=44407 
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Digital forensics is a process with distinct stages, and as such separate quality assurance 
practices and processes could not only be applied at each stage of the process, but also 
collectively across the entire digital forensics process. 
An examination of the various digital forensics process models shows that they all 
contain the following three phases: acquisition of evidence, examination and analysis of 
the evidence, and reporting on the evidence. These three phases exist in each model, 
and always follow on from each other (although there may be some additional 
processes between them in some models, the general flow from one process to the 
next is in the same direction) and therefore, this can be considered to be a simplified 
digital forensics process model. 
Figure 8 · Simple Digital Forensics Process 
This simplification of the various digital forensics process models clearly illustrates that 
before any digital evidence can be examined and analysed, it must first be acquired. In 
essence this means that the acquisition of the digital evidence is the most critical part of 
the digital forensics process as it is the one on which all others depend. In light of the 
legal issues addressing admissibility and reliability of digital evidence discussed 
previously, it can be deduced that anything that influences the admissibility or reliability 
of the digital evidence during the acquisition phase, will taint all the other phases. This 
could result in the very real possibility that any evidence thus obtained could be 
challenged in court and potentially excluded from the case at hand. 
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2.4. THE FORENSIC ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The first forensic task in digital forensics is to make a forensic image of the original 
media, essentially preserving the digital evidence (Nelson, Phillips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 
2008). Forensic acquisitions can take place in a "dead" environment where the media to 
be acquired is removed from the host and is attached to another host with a write 
blocker to obta in a forensic image, or in a "live" environment where the media is still 
connected to its host and a forensic image is made of it while it is still connected to the 
host. A "live" environment is when the host device is still powered on and running when 
the forensic acquisition process takes place. 
Live acquisitions have become common practice due to issues such as encryption; 
however, because this process will alter the original media, digital forensic practitioners 
need to be able to document these changes and explain them in court to ensure 
admissibility as required by the ACPO guidelines (Association of Chief Police Officers, 
2007). The forensic acquisition process is the process whereby digital evidence is 
preserved in a forensically and legally valid manner that is designed to prevent or 
minimise any alteration or modification of the source data (Sansurooah, 2006). This 
process is generally referred to as forensic imaging of the evidence (Marcella & 
Guillossou, 2012). 
The forensic acquisition process should change the original evidence as little as possible, 
and if changes do occur, these changes must be identified and documented, and then 
assessed in the examination and analysis of the evidence (Casey, 2007). 
To illustrate this, consider attaching a USB device containing a forensic imaging 
software application to a computer running Windows 7 Professional with Bitlocker 
active. It is necessary to obtain a forensic image of the unencrypted volume, and this 
can only be done while the computer is running . However, on connecting the USB 
device to the computer, a number of Registry hives will be written to and data 
introduced, as well as entries made in the Windows Event Logs located on the media to 
be imaged . Digital forensic practitioners must be in a position to explain their actions 
and detail exactly what has been altered on the system through these actions. 
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The key issue in the forensic acquisition process is that it preserves a complete and 
accurate representation of the original data, and that the authenticity and integrity of 
the evidence can be validated (Casey, 2007). 
2.4.1. Write Blocking 
The simple act of booting a computer, as well as just general interaction with data 
contained on magnetic and solid state storage media, will normally change data 
contained on the media connected to the computer, and this contamination can 
destroy or alter significant data before it can be forensically preserved (Sansurooah, 
2006). It is due to this phenomenon that when making a forensic image of original 
evidence, it is imperative to use a write blocker (Marcella & Guillossou, 2012). A write 
blocker is a mechanism that intercepts write commands to media before they can be 
executed on the media, which prevents any alteration to the media. A hardware write 
blocker is a physical device which media is connected to which intercepts and blocks 
any write commands, while a software write blocker configures media to be read only, 
thereby preventing alteration. 
The National Institute of Justice strongly recommends that write protection should be 
used, if available and applicable, when acquiring digital evidence, so as to preserve and 
protect the original evidence (National Institute of Justice, 2004). 
A write blocker allows data to be read from a device or media, but prevents any writes 
being made to that device or media. Hardware based write blockers are preferred over 
software write blockers, but there are times when each has specific applications to 
which it is best suited (Marcella & Guillossou, 2012). 
A write blocker, whether implemented in hardware or software, is a crucia l part of the 
forensic acquisition process, and as such it is critical that it functions correctly so as to 
preserve the original evidence as much as possible. 
2.4.2. Forensic Imaging 
There are fundamentally two types of forensic imaging methods when dealing with 
media: making a forensic image of the entire physical media, or only of a logical volume 
(Nelson, Phillips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 2008). A logical forensic image is usually made of 
an encrypted volume, while the media is connected to its host and the volume is 
currently decrypted. 
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A forensic image is essentially a bit-by-bit copy of the original media that is being 
imaged (Marcella & Guillossou, 2012). In principle it obtains all the data contained on 
the media being imaged, including the " live" data, as well as data in unused areas of the 
media, so that the forensic image itself can be examined as if it were the origina l media 
(Sammes & Jenkinson, 2007). The bit-by-bit forensic imaging process involves 
duplicating all of the data in each and every sector of the original media to a forensic 
image (Kenneally & Brown, 2005). A forensic image can, depending on the format, also 
contain metadata relevant to the imaging process itself, such as the image hash values, 
the date and time of the acquisition, and the details of the examiner making the 
forensic image. 
Certain digital forensic practitioners refer to forensic imaging as mirroring and the 
resulting forensic image as a mirror image, implying that it is a true mirror of the 
physical original; however, this is simply not the case. It may be a true bit-by-bit copy of 
the data, but not of the physical strata of the media, and as such is not a mirror copy of 
the image. Thus, the use of the term mirror image or mirroring is simply inaccurate 
{Sammes & Jenkinson, 2007). 
Perhaps t he most crucial aspect of the forensic imaging process is the process of 
validating the data acquisition (which is not the same as validating the tools used). 
During the data validation process, a one-way hash calculation is performed on the 
original media using the MD5 of one of the SHA hashing algorithms to create a hash 
value, which functions as a type of digital fingerprint for that particular media. The one-
way hash calculation is then performed on the data from the forensic image using the 
same hashing algorithm to create a hash value. If the hash values of the original data 
and the image match, then the forensic image is said to be a true "duplicate original" of 
the original media {Nelson, Phillips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 2008). If they do not match, 
there has been a problem in the forensic imaging process, and the reliabi lity of the 
forensic image could be brought into question. 
A forensic image is mathematically identical to the original media from which it is made, 
and is thus legally considered a duplicate original and carries the same weight in court 
as original evidence would . As a result of this, the reliability ofthe software or hardware 
forensic imager that creates the forensic image is crucial to ensure the admissibility of 
the digital evidence in court. 
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2.4.3. Quality Assurance Practices in Digital Forensics Relating to the Forensic Acquisition 
Process 
A number of quality assurance practices have been identified in relation to the forensic 
acquisition of digital evidence. 
However, all of these practices are compromised if the competency of individual 
forensic examiners is not assured. A fundamental determination of quality in a forensic 
laboratory is the technical capabilities of the laboratory, as well as the abilities of the 
staff members (Swanson, Chamelin, Territo, & Taylor, 2006). Quality in forensic science 
can only be achieved by using competent forensic practitioners that work under the 
guidance of a quality system. Competence is defined as the mixture of knowledge and 
skills, application thereof by a forensic practitioner, and the appropriate attitudes and 
behaviours of the practitioner (Fereday & Kopp, 2003). Another important element of 
ensuring the quality of digital forensic processes is to ensure that all digital forensic 
examiners are technically competent in the field of digital forensics, and do not simply 
have training in the use of specific forensic tools (Philipp, Cowen, & Davis, 2010). 
The core skills and knowledge of a digital forensics practitioner with regard to the 
fo rensic acquisition of digital evidence include (Valli, 2006): 
• applying valid forensic processes and principles to acquire digital evidence, 
• validating forensic acquisition processes and outcomes using sound scientific 
principles, 
• validating forensic acquisition technology using sound scientific methods and 
principles. 
In relation to the forensic acquisition process, it is thus crucial that digital forensic 
practitioners are competent to perform all tasks required during the forensic acquisition 
process, which should include not only the forensic imaging process itself, but also the 
importance of using validated write blockers and forensic imaging tools, and potentially 
how to actually validate the tools used in these processes. 
Assuring the quality of the acquisition phase of the digital forensic process is the most 
critical step, as if the acquisition is not carried out correctly, the evidence cannot be 
used. Quality assurance in the acquisition phase of this process can be achieved through 
the use of documented proven standard procedures using verified forensic tools to 
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produce a verified digital evidence image by persons competent to do so, providing that 
this is checked to ensure that it has been done (Jones & Valli, 2009). 
Quality assurance must also be applied to the software tools used in the digital forensic 
process, including forensic acquisition. Quality assurance can be demonstrated through 
testing that various critical processes in the digital forensic process are carried out 
accurately by the application by using appropriate testing such as that used by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology's Computer Forensic Tool Testing 
project (CFTT). The fundamental tests that must be conducted for the software 
applications used in the forensic acquisition process include (Jones & Valli, 2009): 
• that any software that makes a forensic copy of a device or artefacts does so 
accurately, and 
• that any software that produces a checksum, timestamp, or similar device used 
to verify or validate a digital artefact does so accurately. 
The criteria used by the NIST CFTT project is based on standard testing methods and ISO 
17025 criteria (Nelson, Phillips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 2008). 
Hardware that is used during the forensic acquisition process must also be subjected to 
quality assurance processes, especially hard drives, write blockers, disk imagers, and 
computers {Jones & Valli, 2009). As a minimum, this should include: 
• Hard drives used to store forensic images must be tested for fau lts on a regu lar 
basis with the appropriate vendor diagnostic tools. 
• Before any hard drive is used to store digital evidence, it must be sanitised of any 
ambient data, and this must be confirmed before it is used. 
• Write blockers and disk imagers must be tested on a regular basis to verify that 
they are working correctly. 
• Computers and the hardware therein should be regularly tested using the 
relevant vendor diagnostic tools. 
Due to the nature of the hardware that can be used in the forensic acquisition process, 
it is crucial that it is tested at regular scheduled intervals to ensure that it works 
correctly and functions as expected {Jones & Valli, 2009). 
When examining the quality assurance practices relating to the hardware and software 
used in the forensic acquisition process, a common practice is the use of hardware or 
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software that has been validated as functioning correctly. In the case of write blockers 
this ensures that they prevent the writing of data to the original media in the forensic 
acquisition process, while in the case of forensic imaging, it ensures that the forensic 
image obtained is a true "duplicate original" of the original media. 
2.4.4. Importance of Validation in the Forensic Acquisition Process 
Digital forensic practitioners make extensive use of forensic software and hardware, 
and to ensure quality results, they need to satisfactorily answer a number of questions, 
such as whether the forensic software used has any undocumented "bugs" and whether 
the forensic hardware was performing correctly (Barbara, 2007). The forensic 
acquisition process can involve the use of write blockers, which can be either hardware 
or software, but will always make use of forensic imaging hardware or software, and as 
such digital forensic tools are a key component of the forensic acquisition process. 
Science has the power to persuade in a court of law, and as such it is crucial that the 
courts assess the validity of a scientific process before accepting its result (Casey, 2011). 
The power of science in a court of law arises as a result ofthe supposed objectivity of its 
methods (Hanna & Mazza, 2006). In other words, the fact that evidence is scientific in 
nature often adds weight to it in a court of law. A central assumption in this is the fact 
that the court of law assumes that the scientific evidence, such as that presented as a 
result of the digital forensics process, is produced through an objective scientific 
process using validated methods and tools. 
Determining the reliability of forensic tools through validation and verification is a 
critical quality assurance practice in digital forensics. This is in line with requirements of 
all forensic sciences, which require that the tools that are used must be trust-worthy. 
Validation is defined as the confirmation by examination and the provision of objective 
evidence that a tool functions correctly and as intended. Verification is defined as the 
confirmation of a validation with laboratory tools (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
Hardware and software tools can have defects, and the digital forensics community 
have a responsibility to identify these defects owing to the nature of forensic work 
undertaken by them, which must satisfy the most stringent standards to have va lue in a 
court of law (Wilsdon & Slay, 2006). It has been observed through interactions with 
many digital forensic practitioners that some forensic tool vendors promote the 
strengths of their tools while underplaying their weaknesses, which have included 
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incomplete forensic acquisitions, amongst others (Casey, 2005). It is crucial that digital 
forensic practitioners apply due diligence to ensure that the tools used in the forensic 
acquisition process work correctly. This is best done through validation either by 
themselves or through a trusted testing process; simply relying on vendor assurances is 
a significant risk. 
Digital forensic examiners should be rigorously questioned when testifying to ensure 
their credibility and that of their findings. Some of the questions that they should be 
asked in court include whether they have documentation demonstrating that the 
forensic software or hardware used were validated prior to their use (Barbara, 2007). 
Fundamentally, the importance of validation testing of the tools used in the forensic 
acquisition process, whether a write blocker of forensic imager, is that it establishes the 
reliability of the tools used to obtain the digital evidence that will be used in a court of 
law. If the reliability cannot be established, then the reliability of the evidence itself 
would potentially be brought into question. 
In a South African context, the courts must consider Section 15(3) of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (Republic of South Africa, 2002), to 
determine evidential weight of digital evidence, and reliability is an aspect that must be 
satisfied. If the reliability of a tool used to acquire the digital evidence is challenged, and 
it cannot be countered through an objective means that it is valid and reliable, the court 
must take this into consideration. 
2.5. VALIDATION STANDARDS AND PRACTICES RElATING TO THE FORENSIC ACQUISITION 
PROCESS 
A number of validation and verification standards and practices exist that are applicable 
to the various forensic tools that can be used in the forensic acquisition process. These 
include hardware or software write blockers, and forensic imaging software or 
hardware. Some are formally documented standards, while others are practices that 
have developed in an ad-hoc manner by the digital forensics community of 
practitioners. It is critical to be able to verify the results of any digital forensics tool 
used, so that the accuracy of the tool can be assured (Carrier, 2003). 
In the United States, the Daubert standards, which must be taken into account by a trial 
judge to assess the credibility of scientific evidence, require that the known or potential 
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error rate for a particular technique be identified. This has led to some researchers 
stating that the decision by the trial judge in the Daubert case itself has motivated the 
necessity to establish error rates for digital forensic tools (Lyle, 2010). 
Although the nature of the errors that can occur in complex systems such as those used 
in a normal computing environment means that the individual errors per test case can 
be quantified one by one, there does not seem to be a reasonable method to aggregate 
all of these individual errors into an error rate (Lyle, 2010), as some researchers have 
stated is a requirement to satisfy the Daubert requirements. This is simply due to the 
number of variables that exist in any computing system, where multiple software 
applications are interacting with multiple hardware components, as well as each other. 
That simply makes it impractical to establish generic error rates. 
It is felt that a general error rate for digital forensic tools is not meaningful, and it is 
more meaningful to identify the specific errors that can occur and account for these, 
due to the systematic nature of the errors that can occur in a computing environment. 
To satisfy the spirit of the Daubert requirements (if not the letter thereof), t he types of 
errors and failures for each digital forensic tool, and what conditions trigger a particular 
error or failure should be identified and documented (Lyle, 2010). 
A digital forensic tool validation process should involve the following (Wilsdon & Slay, 
2006): 
• acquisition ofthe forensic tool to be evaluated, 
• identification of the specific functions of the forensic tool, 
• development of test cases and reference sets to be used in the evaluation 
process, 
• development of an acceptable desired standard for the results, 
• execution of the tests and evaluation of the results, and 
• release of the results ofthe evaluation. 
It must be borne in mind that the development of extensive and exhaustive tests to 
validate and verify digital forensics tools is a lengthy and complex process (Guo, Slay, & 
Beckett, 2009). In addition to this, the ability to test digital forensic tools is often limited 
due to both time and financial constraints for many digital forensic practitioners 
(Wilsdon & Slay, 2006). In general, digital forensic practitioners have heavy workloads 
and va riations in resources and skill levels, providing conditions that are conducive to 
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errors occurring in digital forensic tool testing. As a result, the tests themselves may not 
be accurate {Pan & Batten, 2009). 
2.5.1. National Institute of Standards and Technology Computer Forensics Tool Testing 
Project 
2.5.1.1. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology {NIST) has been one of the 
pioneering organ isations trying to address validation and ve rification of digital forensics 
tools through their Computer Forensics Tool Testing (Cm) project. They have 
developed specific testing methodologies for write blockers and forensic imaging (Guo, 
Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
The NIST CFTI standards are very comprehensive, but the technical comprehensiveness 
of the testing criteria also means that testing is time consuming, and requires a high 
level oftechnical proficiency. 
Hardware Write Blockers 
The NIST em project defined a fundamental principle when evaluating hardware write 
blockers that they should block all modifying commands sent to a hard drive. This was 
subsequently used to define specific requirements for hardware write blockers as 
detailed in Table 1 (Lyle, 2006). 
Table 1 - NIST CFTI Hardware Write Blocker Requirements 
Requirement Description 
HWB-RM-01 A hardware write blocker shall not, after receiving an operation of any 
category from the host, nor any time during its operation, transmit 
any modifying category operation to a protected storage device. 
HWB-RM-02 A hardware write blocker, after receiving a read category operation 
from the host, shall return the data requested by the read operation. 
HWB-RM-03 A hardware write blocker, after receiving and information category 
operation from the host shall return a response to the host that shall 
not modify and access significant information contained in the 
response. 
HWB-RM-04 Any error condition reported by the storage device to the hardware 
write blocker shall be reported to the host. 
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The requirements for hardware write blockers were then used to develop test 
assertions, which are testable statements as detailed in Table 2 (Lyle, 2006). 
Table 2- NIST CFTT Hardware Write Blocker Test Assertions 
Assertion Description 
HWB-AM-01 The hardware write blocker shall not transmit any modifying category 
operation to the protected storage device. 
HWB-AM-02 If the host sends a read category operation to the hardware write 
blocker and no error is returned from the protected device to t he 
hardware write blocker, then the data addressed by the original read 
operation are returned to the host. 
HWB-AM-03 If the host sends an information category operation to the hardware 
write blocker and if there is no error on the protected storage device, 
then any returned access significant information is returned t o the 
host without modification. 
HWB-AM-04 If the host sends an operation to the hardware write blocker and if 
the operation results in an unresolved error on the protected storage 
device, then the hardware write blocker shall return an error status 
code to the host. 
HWB-AM-05 The action that a hardware write blocker device takes for any 
commands not assigned to the modifying, read or information 
categories is defined by the vendor. 
These assertions can be measured to ensure conformity using operational, 
observational, indirect, and detailed methods. To facilitate this process, a number of 
defined test cases are used as detailed in Table 3 (Lyle, 2006). 
Table 3 - NIST CFTT Hardware Write Blocker Test Cases 
Test Description 
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HWB-01 Identify commands blocked by the hardware write blocker. This case 
uses a protocol analyser and a general command generator. 
HWB-02 Identify modifying commands blocked by the hardware write blocker. 
This case uses a write command generator to try to write a unique 
message to a unique location for each defined write command. 
HWB-03 Identify commands blocked by the hardware write blocker while 
attempting to modify a protected drive with forensic tools. This case 
uses a protocol analyser to record the commands generated and 
blocked by attempting to write to a drive with either a forensic tool or 
an operating system command. 
HWB-04 Attempt to modify a protected drive with forensic tools. This case 
attempts to write to a drive with either a forensic tool or an operating 
system command. Any modifications to the protected drive are 
detected by comparing a pre-test hash to a post-test hash. 
HWB-05 Identify read commands allowed by the hardware write blocker. A 
read command generator is used to try to read known data from a 
drive using each defined read command. 
HWB-06 Identify read and information commands use by forensic tools and 
allowed by the hardware write blocker. Use a forensic tool to read an 
entire drive with a protocol analyser recording the actual commands 
used by the forensic tool. 
HWB-07 Read a protected drive with forensic tools. Use a forensic tool to read 
an entire drive. 
HWB-08 Identify access significant information unmodified by the hardware 
write blocker. Use a tool to generate a request for drive size and 
verify that the correct size is reported. 
HWB-09 Determine if an error on the protected drive is returned to the host. 
Generate an error at the drive by attempting to read a sector beyond 
the end of the drive. 
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2.5.1.2. Software Write Blockers 
The NIST CFTI project defined a fundamental principle when evaluating software write 
blockers that they should not allow a protected drive to be changed, they should not 
prevent obtaining any information from or about any drive, and they should not 
prevent any operations to a drive that is not protected. These were then used to define 
specific requirements for software write blockers as detailed in Table 4 (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003). 
Table 4- NIST CFTI Software Write Blocker Requirements 
Requirement Description 
SWB-RM-01 The tool shall block any commands to a protected drive in the write, 
configuration, or miscellaneous categories. 
SWB-RM-02 The tool shall not block any commands to a protected drive in thread, 
control or information categories. 
SWB-RM-03 The tool shall give an indication to the user that the tool is active. 
SWB-RM-04 The tool shall report all drives accessible by the covered interfaces. 
SWB-RM-05 The tool shall report the protection status of all drives. 
SWB-RM-06 The tool shall, if so configured, adjust the return value of any blocked 
commands to indicate that the operation was carried out successfully 
even though the operation was blocked. 
SWB-RM-07 The tool shall, if so configured, adjust the return value of any blocked 
commands to indicate that the operation failed. 
SWB-RM-08 The tool shall not block any commands to an unprotected drive. 
The requirements for software write blockers were subsequently used to develop test 
assertions as detailed in Table 5 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003). 
Table 5 - NIST CFTI Software Write Blocker Test Assertions 
Assertion Description 
SWB-AM-01 
SWB-AM-02 
If a drive is protected and a command from the write category is 
issued for the protected drive then the tool shall block the command. 
If a drive is protected and a command from the configuration 
category is issued for the protected drive then the tool shall block the 
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command. 
SWB-AM-03 If a drive is protected and a command from the miscellaneous 
category is issued for the protected drive then the tool shall block the 
command . 
SWB-AM-04 If a drive is protected and a command from the read category is 
issued for the protected drive then the tool shall not block the 
command. 
SWB-AM-05 If a drive is protected and a command from the control category is 
issued for the protected drive then the tool shall not block the 
command. 
SWB-AM-06 If a drive is protected and a command from the information category 
is issued for the protected drive then the tool shall not block the 
command. 
SWB-AM-07 If the tool is executed then the tool shall issue a message indicating 
that the tool is active. 
SWB-AM-08 If the tool is executed t hen the tool shall issue a message indicating all 
drives accessible by the covered interfaces. 
SWB-AM-09 If the tool is executed then the toot shall issue a message indicating 
the protection status of each drive attached to a covered interface. 
SWB-AM-10 If the tool is configured to return success on blocked commands and 
the tool blocks a command then the return code shall indicate 
successful command execution. 
SWB-AM-11 If the tool is configured to return fail on blocked commands and the 
tool blocks a command then the return code shall indicate 
unsuccessful command execution. 
These assertions can then be measured to ensure conformity. To facilitate this process, 
a number of defined test cases are used, a sample of which are given in Table 6 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003). 
Table 6 - NIST CFTI Software Write Blocker Test Cases 
Test Description 
SWB-01 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect all drives, and 
35 I P a e c 
execute write commands. 
SWB-02 Install two drives, configure return code to success, protect all drives, 
and execute write commands. 
SWB-03 Install one drive, configure return code to fail , protect all drives, and 
execute configuration commands. 
SWB-04 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect all drives, 
and execute configuration commands. 
SWB-05 Install two drives, configure return code to fail, protect all drives, and 
execute miscellaneous commands. 
SWB-06 Install one drive, configure return code to success, protect all drives, 
and execute miscellaneous commands. 
SWB-07 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect all drives, and 
execute read commands. 
SWB-08 Install two drives, configure return code to success, protect all drives, 
and execute read commands. 
SWB-09 Install one drive, configure return code to fail, protect all drives, and 
execute information commands. 
SWB-10 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect all drives, 
and execute information commands. 
SWB-11 Install two drives, configure return code to fail, protect all drives, and 
execute control commands. 
SWB-12 Install one drive, configure return code to success, protect all drives, 
and execute control commands. 
SWB-13 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
odd (Pattern odd protects each odd numbered drive: Ox81, Ox83, 
Ox85, etc.), and execute write commands. 
SWB-14 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern low (Pattern low protects the low numbered drives: Ox80, 
Ox81, etc. Given n drives, the first unprotected drive is Ox80 + n/2, 
using integer division discarding any fraction), and execute write 
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commands. 
SWB-15 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
first {Pattern first protects drive Ox80), execute configuration 
commands. 
SWB-16 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern mid (Pattern mid protects, given n drives, drive Ox80 + n/2. 
Discarding any fraction), and execute configuration commands. 
SWB-17 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
random_p (Pattern random protected, selects at random one drive 
that has not been used as a single protected drive. If there are no 
unused drives, selected any drive at random), and execute 
miscellaneous commands. 
SWB-18 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern not_last (Given n drives, protect all drives except for drive 
Ox80 + n -1), and execute miscellaneous commands. 
SWB-19 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
last (Given n drives protect drive Ox80 + n- 1.), execute read 
commands. 
SWB-20 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern not_ mid (Given n drives, protect all drives except for Ox80 + 
n/2, discarding any fraction), and execute read commands. 
SWB-21 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
high (Protect the high numbered drives. Given n drives, the first 
protected drive is Ox80 + n/2), and execute information commands. 
SWB-22 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern not_ first (Protect all drives except for Ox80, and execute 
information commands. 
SWB-23 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
random_u (Select at random one drive that has not been used as a 
single unprotected drive. If there are no unused drives, select any 
drive at random), and execute control commands. 
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SWB-24 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern even {Protect the even numbered drives: OxO, Ox82, Ox4, etc.), 
and execute control commands. 
SWB-25 Install three drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
PUU (The first drive is protected and the second and third drives are 
not protected), and execute write commands. 
SWB-26 Install three drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern UPU (The second drive is protected and the first and third 
drives are not protected), and execute write commands. 
SWB-27 Install three drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
UUP (The third d rive is protected and the first and second drives are 
not protected), and execute write commands. 
SWB-28 Install three drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern UPP, and execute write commands. 
SWB-29 Install three drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
PUP, and execute write commands. 
SWB-30 Install three drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern PPU, and execute write commands. 
SWB-31 Install three drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
PUU, and execute read commands. 
SWB-32 Install three drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern UPU, and execute read commands. 
SWB-33 Install three drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
UUP, and execute read commands. 
SWB-34 Install three drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern UPP, and execute read commands. 
SWB-35 Install three drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
PUP, and execute read commands. 
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2.5.1.3. 
SWB-36 Install three drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern PPU, and execute read commands. 
SWB-37 Install all drives, configure to be active at boot and shutdown, 
configure return code to fail, protect with pattern odd, and execute 
write commands. 
SWB-38 Install all drives, configure to be active at boot and shutdown, 
configure return code to success, protect with pattern even, and 
execute write commands. 
SWB-39 Install all drives, configure return code to fail, protect with pattern 
high, execute write commands, uninstall, and execute all commands. 
SWB-40 Install all drives, configure return code to success, protect with 
pattern low, execute write commands, uninstall, and execute all 
commands. 
Forensic Imaging Tools 
The forensic imaging specification developed by the NIST CFTI requires that a forensic 
imaging application must make a bit-stream duplicate or forensic image of an origina l 
disk or partition, it must not alter the original disk, it must be able to verify the integrity 
of an image file, and it must log 1/0 errors (Lyle, 2003). 
When making a forensic image of a hard drive, all sectors of the media should be 
completely and accurate ly acquired and saved to an image file. However, some hard 
drives will occasionally contain faulty sectors that cannot be acquired using traditional 
forensic imaging tools. Forensic imaging tools should meet the following requirements 
(which are requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the 
United StatesL for handling faulty sectors (Lyle & Wozar, 2007): 
• The tool must acquire all sectors that are not faulty. 
• The tool must identify all faulty sectors. 
• In instances where there are faulty sectors, the forensic image file must replace 
the faulty sector content with benign fill that will have no influence on the results 
of an examination. 
39 I Page 
These were subsequently used to define specific requirements for forensic imaging 
tools as detailed in Table 7 {National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004). 
Table 7 - NIST CFTI Forensic Imaging Tool Requirements 
Requirement Description 
DI-RM-01 The tool shall be able to acquire a digital source using each access 
interface visible to the tool. 
DI-RM-02 The tool shall be able to create either a clone of a digital source, or an 
image of a digital source, or provide the capability for the user to 
select and then create either a clone or an image of a digital source. 
DI-RM-03 The tool shall operate in at least one execution environment and shall 
be able to acquire digital sources in each execution environment. 
DI-RM-04 The tool shall completely acquire all visible data sectors from the 
digital source. 
DI-RM-05 The tool shall completely acquire all hidden data sectors from the 
digital source. 
DI-RM-06 All data sectors acquired by the tool from the digital source shall be 
accurately acquired. 
DI-RM-07 If there are unresolved errors reading from a digital source then the 
tool shall notify the user of the error type and the error location. 
DI-RM-08 If there are unresolved errors reading from a digital source then the 
tool shall use a benign fill in the destination object in place of the 
inaccessible data. 
The requirements for forensic imaging tools were then used to develop test assertions 
as detailed in Table 8 {National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005). 
Table 8- NIST CFTI Forensic Imaging Tool Test Assertions 
Assertion Description 
DA-AM-01 The tool uses access interface SRC-AI to access the digital source. 
DA-AM-02 The tool acquires digital source DS. 
DA-AM-03 The tool executes in execution environment XE. 
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DA-AM-04 If clone creation is specified, the tool creates a clone of the digital 
source. 
DA-AM-05 If image file creation is specified, the tool creates an image file on file 
system type FS. 
DA-AM-06 All visible sectors are acquired from the digital source. 
DA-AM-07 All hidden sectors are acquired from the digital source. 
DA-AM-08 All sectors acquired from the digita l source are acquired accurately. 
DA-AM-09 If unresolved errors occur while reading from the selected digita l 
source, the tool notifies the user of the error type and location within 
the digital source. 
DA-AM-10 If unresolved errors occur while reading from the selected digital 
source, the tool uses a benign fill in the destination object in place of 
the inaccessible data. 
These assertions can be measured to ensure conformity. To facilitate this process, a 
number of defined test cases are used as detailed in Table 9 (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2005); however, not all test cases would be required for all 
assertions. 
Table 9- NIST CFTI Forensic Imaging Tool Test Casrs 
Test Description 
DA-01 Acquire a physical device using access interface AI to an unaligned 
clone. 
DA-02 Acquire a digital source of type DS to an unaligned clone. 
DA-03 Acquire a physical device to a cylinder aligned clone. 
DA-04 Acquire a physical device to a truncated clone. 
DA-05 Respond to a write error on the clone device during an acquisition to 
a clone. 
DA-06 Acquire a physical device using access interface AI to an image file . 
DA-07 Acquire a digital source of type DS to an image file. 
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DA-08 Acquire a physical drive with hidden sectors to an image file. 
DA-09 Acquire a digital source that has at least one faulty data sector. 
DA-10 Acquire a digital source to an image file in an alternate format. 
DA-11 Respond to a disk error writing an image file. 
DA-12 Attempt to create an image file where there is insufficient space. 
DA-13 Create an image file where there is insufficient space on a single 
volume, and use destination device switching to continue on another 
volume. 
DA-14 Create an unaligned clone from an image file . 
DA-15 Create a cylinder aligned clone from an image file. 
DA-16 Create a clone from a subset of an image file. 
DA-17 Create a truncated clone from an image file. 
DA-18 Respond to a write error on the clone device while creating a clone 
from an image. 
DA-19 Acquire a physical device to an unaligned clone, filling excess sectors. 
DA-20 Acquire a logical device to an unaligned clone, filling excess sectors. 
DA-21 Acquire a physical device to a cylinder aligned clone, filling excess 
sectors. 
DA-22 Create an unaligned clone from an image file, filling excess sectors. 
DA-23 Create a cylinder aligned clone from an image file, filling excess 
sectors. 
DA-24 Verify a va lid image. 
DA-25 Detect a corrupted image. 
DA-26 Convert an image to an alternate image file format. 
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2.5.2. The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence 
The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) has also been working on 
issues pertaining to the validation and verification of digital forensics tools, and rather 
than develop specific testing methodologies as the NIST CFTI project has done, they 
have recommended general guidelines for validation testing. The SWGDE validation 
guidelines for digital forensic tools include defining the purpose and scope of the 
validation test, defining the requirements to be tested, determining the methodology to 
be used, selecting appropriate test scenarios, conducting the tests, and documenting 
the process (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
It is recommended that validation testing should be performed whenever a new, 
revised or reconfigured tool is introduced into the forensic process (Scientific Working 
Group on Digital Evidence, 2009). 
The recommendation for when tools should be tested however, does not take into 
account hardware based tools, which being electronic devices, can fail over time and as 
such, should be tested on a regular basis to ensure that they remain functional. 
2.5.3. European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes has published broad validation 
testing guidelines for forensic imaging, which recommend that the imaging tools be 
checked to ensure that they make no changes to the original media, that the imaging 
verification process is reliable, and that the audit or log functions of the tool are 
accurate and detailed. With regard to write blocking tools, all that they require is that 
they need to be tested to ensure that they do not change any data on the original 
media (European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, 2009). 
2.5.4. Dual Tool Validation 
Dual tool verification is a process whereby two different digital forensics tools are used 
to confirm whether both tools produce the same result (Association of Chief Police 
Officers, 2011). 
After one tool has been used to obtain a particular outcome, the results should be 
verified by performing the same tasks with another similar forensic tool (Nelson, Phillips, 
Enfinger, & Steuart, 2008). Cross-validation is an important element of quality 
assurance in digital forensics, and requ ires the findings of a particular digital forensic 
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tool to be verified by another digital forensic tool (Philipp, Cowen, & Davis, 2010). 
Making use of only one forensic tool (and therefore trusting it blindly) creates an 
opportunity for the opposing party to target the tool instead of the process. 
There is, however, a logical flaw in the concept of dual tool validation. What if both 
tools that are used in a dual tool validation do not work correctly? Unless the tool used 
to compare against is known to be functioning correctly and reliably, one cannot say 
with certainty that the tool it is being compared to is functioning correctly either. If one 
does make use of the dual tool validation method, then the tool being used for 
comparison purposes should at least have been independently validated to ensure a 
measure of reliability. 
2.5.5. Vendor Validation 
There is a heavy reliance on digital forensic tools in the practice of digital forensics, and 
this reliance often hinges on blind faith that the specific tool works. This has actually 
lead to industry myths that certain of these tools have been accepted by the courts and 
are thus court validated. Vendors, who are often protective of their commercial market 
share, have not officially published error rates for their digital forensic tools, or the 
exact reasons for minor and major version changes (Meyers & Rogers, 2005). 
A problem with vendor validation is that it is generally undocumented and not proven 
publically, except through comments, which are mostly hearsay on the bulletin boards 
of the vendors themselves (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009). 
Unless the vendor validation has been documented and made publically available, little 
reliance can actually be placed on the idea of vendor validation. 
2.6. SUMMARY 
Digital evidence is clearly defined both from a scientific and legal perspective, and both 
definitions are aligned to each other. The nature of digital evidence, however, does 
raise certain legal challenges, which need to be addressed to ensure the reliability and 
admissibility of the evidence. Digital forensics is the process that fundamentally 
addresses the reliability and admissibility of the digital evidence in a court of law. 
Digital forensics is a science, and as such is considered to be governed by many of the 
requirements of traditional forensic science. Thus, issues such as quality assurance are 
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crucial to ensuring that the evidence produced through a forensic science process is 
considered valid. A number of models have been developed describing the digital 
forensics process, all of which include three specific stages: acquisition, examination 
and analysis, and report and testifying. 
A key aspect of the digital forensics process is that the digital evidence must first be 
preserved for examination and analysis during the forensic acquisition phase, and as 
such this phase is considered the most critically important of the entire digital forensics 
process. It is thus crucial that quality assurance is ensured in this phase as all other 
phases of the digital forensics process are dependent on it. 
The forensic acquisition phase consists of one mandatory process, forensic imaging, and 
another recommended process, write blocking. These processes play a significant role in 
the preservation of the digital evidence, which is used for later examination and 
analysis, and which will ultimately be presented in court. As such it is crucial that the 
evidence preserved through this is reliable. These processes are, however, dependent 
on software and/or hardware tools and it is crucial that these tools function reliably and 
correctly, so that the evidence preserved though them can be considered reliable as 
well. There is a real risk in court that if the tools used are not reliable, then the 
reliability of the digital evidence court will be brought into question and the evidence 
ruled inadmissible. 
Tool validation is the process by which the various forensic tools are tested and 
evaluated for reliability. Specific validation practices and standards are considered 
within the digital forensics community. 
There are formally documented testing standards such as those developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, which are very comprehensive and 
technically valid. There are recommended testing guidelines such as those issued by the 
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence and the European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes. There are also practitioner standards that have evolved through 
practice, such as dual tool validation. Finally, there is the belief that vendors themselves 
validate the tools. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of the research was to examine the current state of validation testing 
practices with regards the hardware and/or software tools used by digital forensic 
practitioners in South Africa for the purposes of preserving and acquiring digital 
evidence, so as to determine areas of concern that could negatively impact on the use 
of digital evidence in a court of law. As discussed in Chapter 1, our main objectives were 
the following: 
• To determine the current state of practice with regards the validation testing of 
hardware and/or software tools used in the forensic acquisition process amongst 
South African digital forensic practitioners. 
• To identify shortcomings and deficiencies (if any} in the use of hardware and/or 
software tools used during the forensic acquisition process, relating to the 
reliability of the tools used, and the impact this could have on the reliability of 
digital evidence in court proceedings. 
• To identify possible reasons for any shortcomings and deficiencies (if any) in use 
of hardware and/or software tools used during the forensic acquisition process, 
relating to the reliability of the tools used. 
To achieve the purpose of this research, a specific research methodology was utilised as 
detailed below. 
3.1. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
The research philosophy selected provides the overall assumptions made by the 
research in terms of the way in which the research views the particular field, and 
underpins the research strategy followed as well as the methods chosen as part of that 
strategy (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009}. 
The research philosophy embraced by the researcher was pragmatism. The nature of 
digital forensic practice is, by the nature of the field, multidisciplinary and as such, the 
research questions asked and the relevance of different subject areas may require 
specific epistemologies, ontologies, and axiologies, each to answer a specific research 
question {Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009}. This research philosophy is thus 
appropriate in a multidisciplinary field such as digital forensics. 
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3.2. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
The purpose of the research was an exploratory study. Exploratory studies are suitable 
for establishing what is happening, asking questions, and assessing practices (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill1 2009L which is the fundamental objective of this research . 
An advantage of an exploratory study is that it is particu larly useful in determining the 
nature of a problem and to clarify the understanding thereof {Saunders/ Lewis/ & 
Thornhill, 2009). Previous research, which had a limited scope/ identified some concerns 
with regard to the general validation of tools used in digital forensics in South Africa; 
however, this was not examined in depth. This research builds on this initial research 
and explores validation practices in relation to the forensic acquisition of digital 
evidence in depth. As such an exploratory study is highly relevant. 
3.3. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research approach selected is a combination of deduction and induction. The 
multidisciplinary nature of digital forensics requires an in-depth understanding of 
disciplines ranging from computer science to law to criminology and how these 
interrelate/ as there is not always a simple cause and effect answer (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2009). The inductive research approach allowed the researcher to gain a 
better understanding of the issues and contexts, which add value to the practical 
application of the research, while the deductive approach was used to test the 
hypothesis. 
3.4. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The research strategy selected for the research was a survey based approach. The basis 
for selecting the survey approach is that it allows for the col lection of structured 
quantitative data suitable for an exploratory study. The use of a survey approach using 
questionnaires allows for standardisation of the data and easy comparison thereof 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009) . 
The survey strategy is particularly adept at generating answers to questions such as 
"who11 , "whaf'1 "where11, "how many111 and "how much11 (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2009), which are the fundamental question types utilised as research questions in this 
research. 
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3.5. RESEARCH TIME FRAME 
The research time frame was a cross-sectional one, as it sought to explore the state of 
validation practices in relation to hardware and/or software forensic tools used in the 
forensic acquisition of digital evidence, at a particular point in time. The resu lts are in 
effect a "snapshot" ofthe current situation in time {Saunders, Lewis, & Thornh ill, 2009}. 
3.6. RESEARCH METHOD 
The resea rch method used in the research was a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, providing a holistic approach to the research problem. 
Quantitative research is appropriate when trying to identify trends and generalisations 
that can be applied to a whole population (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
Qualitative research is an approach best suited to attempts to better understand 
complex and interactive phenomena, particularly since these phenomena are often 
unique (Schloss & Smith, 1999). There is no doubt that the interplay between the legal 
system and digital forensic procedures and processes by digital forensic practitioners, is 
complex. The use of a qualitative approach is important, especially when examining 
exactly how digital forensic practitioners conduct validation testing and how these 
practices compare to acceptable standards. Taking these factors into account, a 
qualitative research approach was deemed appropriate. 
3.7. SAMPLING 
The population represents the full set of cases from which a sample can be obtained 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). In the context of this research, the population can 
be defined as digital forensic practitioners practising digital forensics as their primary 
profession. The researcher is the head of a digital forensics laboratory in a national law 
enforcement agency. By virtue of his position he is well known to the digita l forensic 
practit ioner community in South Africa . He also has access to many members of this 
community across multiple agencies and organisations. 
Owing to practical issues such as the availability and willingness of members of the 
population, and the time frame available for conducting the research, it was not 
practical to use the entire population as a source of data for this research . As such it 
was necessary to make use of sampling. A sample is no more than a sub-group of the 
entire population (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009}. 
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To determine the sample, the random sampling method was used {Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2009). The survey instrument used was an online survey, and invitations to 
complete the survey were sent to all known digital forensic practitioners in South Africa; 
those who responded represented a random sample, as the researcher was not in a 
position to determine who would actually respond to the survey. 
3.8. DATA COLLECTION 
The data collection was conducted by means of an Internet based structured 
questionnaire, which is an appropriate method to collect quantitative data and limited 
qualitative data. This allowed for standardisation and ease of comparison. It is also 
shown to be an appropriate data collection method in exploratory studies, such as is the 
case with this research (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
Careful consideration was given to the design of the questionnaire to be used to ensure 
that there was internal valid ity in the questionnaire itself, so that the data would be 
considered valid, while attention was also paid to content validity {Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2009). The questions asked in the questionnaire were specifically selected to 
answer the research questions stated for this research, thereby addressing content 
validity of the questionnaire. 
Reliability of the questionnaire was addressed by designing the questionnaire itself for 
internal consistency by correlating the responses to each question in the questionnaire 
with others in the questionnaire {Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
The questionnaire is detailed in the Appendix. 
3.9. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data received from the respondents to the Internet based survey questionnaire 
formed the basis of the data to be analysed. 
The first stage of the analysis involved collating the data from the questionnaires, which 
was downloaded from the Internet survey system as a spreadsheet and then converted 
into a relational database to allow queries to be run against the data more efficiently. 
The data itself was analysed using an exploratory data analysis approach using diagrams 
and tables to aid in the exploration of the data to identify specific data and values of 
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interest, to identify and compare trends and proportions, and to illustrate distributions 
within the data sets (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
3.10. ETHICALISSUES 
All participants in th is research consented to the research by way of informed consent 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009), which was provided by means of the Internet 
based survey questionnaire. Participation in the research was voluntary, and no 
participant was compelled in any way to participate. 
While the respondents could potentially be identified by their email addresses which 
were recorded in the survey questionnaire, this has not been included in the data 
analysed, and has remained privileged and not released by the researcher. In addition, 
care was taken to ensure that no specific agency affiliations were identified so as not to 
prejudice individual participants or affiliated agencies, which could compromise their 
effectiveness in presenting evidence in court. The confidentiality of the data has been 
maintained at all times. 
In addition to complying with any prescribed research codes of ethics prescribed by 
Rhodes University, the researcher was bound by the code of ethics governing him as a 
computing professional (Code of Ethics of the Institute of Information Technology 
Professionals of South Africa, Code of Ethics of the Association of Computing 
Machinery, and Code of Ethics of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers ), 
as well as those governing him as a professional digital forensic practitioner and fraud 
examiner (Code of Ethics of the International Association of Computer Investigative 
Specialists, Code of Ethics of the SANS Institute, and Code of Ethics of the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners). 
3.11. SUMMARY 
The research design selected allows the collection and ana lysis of relevant data directly 
from primary sources, namely South Africa practitioners who make use of the forensic 
tools to acquire digital evidence. This ensures the relevance of the research to the 
research objectives. 
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4. SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementing the research design required the design and hosting of the questionnaire, 
the invitation to potential respondents to complete the questionnaire, and finally the 
extraction ofthe data from the questionnaire for analysis. 
4.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
The research questionnaire was designed using skip logic so that respondents would 
only have to answer questions that were relevant to them, and as such, an ICT based 
survey platform was considered to allow for the implementation of this. 
The research questionnaire was hosted using SurveyMonke/, an Internet based survey 
service, which was selected owing to its ease of use and security. This tool also allowed 
the use of skip logic in the design of the questionnaire itself, which resulted in a more 
dynamic, yet structured user experience for respondents. 
Before the survey questionnaire went live, it was extensively tested by the researcher 
to ensure that the skip logic functionality functioned correctly, and that the 
questionnaire functioned as intended. Once the testing was finalised the questionnaire 
went live and was available to respondents to complete. 
4.2. IDENTIFICATION OF PROSPECTIVE RESPONDENTS 
The researcher made use of two methods to identify potential respondents, to whom 
emails were sent requesting their participation in the research. 
Email invitations were sent to the managers/heads of the various digital forensic 
capacities within all state institutions with a digital forensics capacity, as well as to 
private sector organisations having a digital forensics capacity, requesting that the 
invitation be forwarded to all of their employees asking for their participation in the 
survey. In total, emails were sent to six state institutions and 19 private organisations. 
The researcher then conducted a search using Linkedln3, to identify all individuals in 
South Africa who were employed as digital forensic practitioners. A total of 57 
individuals were identified that met this criterion and invitations were sent to them 
requesting their participation in the survey. 
2 http://www.surveymonkey.net 
3 http:/ /www.linkedin.com 
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Since a number of these individuals were employed by organisations to which 
invitations had previously been sent, the questionnaire required respondents to provide 
their e-mail address to validate that duplicate responses were not received. 
The survey was opened for participation for a period of six months to ensure a 
maximum possible participation rate. 
4.3. DATA COLLECTION AND COLLATION 
At the time the survey was closed, a total of 56 unique responses had been received, 
and the data were downloaded from SurveyMonkey in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
format, which was then imported into Microsoft Access to be analysed. 
4.4. SUMMARY 
The research implementation was in line with the resea rch design, and the survey was 
deployed using a well-established internet based survey based service. Prospective 
participants were identified, all of which were digital forensic practitioners. In total 56 
digital forensic practitioners responded to the survey and their responses form the core 
of the data that was analysed. 
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5. SURVEY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The research results and findings are based on the data provided by the respondents. 
All of the respondents were current digital forensic practitioners, and as such their 
responses to the survey represent data from the relevant population. 
There were a total of 56 respondents. The population of digital forensic practitioners in 
South Africa is generally considered small, but to date there is no quantifiable data 
indicating the exact number of digital forensic practitioners in South Africa; however, 
estimates place the number at no more than 150 practitioners. Based on the number of 
responses received, it is felt that the sample represented by the respondents is a fair 
representation of the total relevant population. 
5.1. AGE, GENDER, AND LOCATION 
Twenty-three respondents were aged between 30 and 39 years of age (41% of the 
sample}, 17 were aged between 40 and 49 (30% of the sample}, 14 were aged between 
21 and 29 (25% of the sample}, and two were aged between SO and 59 (4% of the 
sample} . The percentages are illustrated in Figure 9. 
50-59 
40-49 
30-39 
• 21-29 
I 
...___ 
Figure 9-Age Distribution 
53 I P a g c 
Forty-eight respondents were male (86% of the sample), and eight were female (14% of 
the sample). The gender distribution expressed as a percentage is illustrated in Figure 
10, which clearly demonstrates that the majority of digital forensic practitioners in 
South Africa are male. 
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Figure 10-Gender Distribution 
Th irty-eight respondents were living in Gauteng (68% of the sample), 11 in the Western 
Cape (20% of the sample), four in the Eastern Cape (11% of the sample), two in the Free 
State (3% of the sample), and one in KwaZulu Natal (2% of the sample) . There were no 
respondents from the Northern Cape, North West, Limpopo, or Mpumalanga. The 
researcher is of the opinion that the reasons for this is that these provinces are not 
major commercial centres, and that due to their proximity to Gauteng they are most 
often serviced by digital forensic practitioners from Gauteng. The provincial distribution 
expressed as a percentage is illustrated in Figure 11. 
2% 
• Gauteng 
• Western Cape 
Eastern Cape 
• Free State 
KwaZulu Natal 
Fi{;ure 11- Geographic Distribution of Respondents 
5.2. EDUCATION 
Digital forensics is a forensic science discipline. Expertise in the field of digital forensics 
requires far more than product knowledge; it requires a wide range of expertise within 
the computer science discipline, ranging from basic concepts such as number systems 
and mathematics through to complex skills in computer science (Valli, 2006). Many of 
these foundation skills and expertise are developed in the secondary school system in 
South Africa, and as such understanding the extent to which digital forensic 
practitioners have mastered these skills and expertise provides a clearer picture of the 
foundation skills of digital forensic practitioners. 
5.2.1. Secondary School Education 
All of the respondents had completed Grade 12. Thirty-seven had completed Grade 12 
with a University exemption, and 19 had completed Grade 12 without a University 
exemption. The percentages are illustrated in Figure 12. 
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• Completed Grade 12 
(University Exemption) 
Completed Grade 12 (No 
University Exemption) 
l- ----------------- -------- ------
Figure 12 - Matriculation 
Figure 12 clearly illustrates that just over a third of the respondents did not pass Grade 
12 with a pass mark that would enable them to study at a tertiary academic institution 
for degree studies. This does have an impact on tertiary studies that are important in 
the field of digital forensics. 
Digital forensics as a forensic science, which itself is considered an applied science, is 
influenced by the STEM subjects at secondary school level, that is, all subjects in 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. In the context of this research, 
understanding the core STEM subjects completed by the respondents at secondary 
school level, establishes the levels of certain foundation skills, which are generally 
considered important in the practice of science. 
Forty-eight respondents had passed mathematics (not mathematics literacy) in Grade 
12 (86% of the sample), two respondents had failed mathematics in Grade 12 (3% of the 
sample), and six respondents did not have mathematics as a subject in Grade 12 (11% of 
the sample). The percentages are illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 - Grade 12 Mathematics 
Thirty-six respondents had passed physical science in Grade 12 (64% of the sample), 
while 20 respondents did not have physical science as a subject in Grade 12 (36% of the 
sample). The percentages are illustrated in Figure 14. 
• Yes (Passed) 
Figure 14 - Grade 12 Physical Science 
Fifteen respondents had passed information technology in Grade 12 (27% of the 
sample), while 41 respondents did not have information technology as a subject in 
Grade 12 (73% of the sample) . The percentages are illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 - Grade 12 Information Technology 
The majority of the respondents had completed mathematics as a subject at secondary 
school, which is considered an important foundation in the field of computing. Although 
physical science is not always considered important in computing, it does make 
students familiar with scientific principles such as the scientific method, and 
experimentation, and almost two thirds of respondents had completed this subject. 
Just under a third of the respondents had completed information technology as a 
subject, which is understandable considering the age demographics of the respondents, 
with none of the respondents in the 40-49 and 50-59 age categories having studied 
information technology at school. For many of the respondents in the 40-49 and 50-59 
age categories, information technology would not generally have been available as a 
school subject. 
5.2.2. Undergraduate Tertiary Education 
While secondary school provides the foundation skills in key STEM subjects crucial for a 
digital forensic practitioner, additional tertiary study is necessary in genera l to develop 
expertise and knowledge. 
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The National Academy of Science in the United States has recommended that as a 
minimum, digital forensic practitioners should have a Bachelor of Science degree in 
computer science or computer engineering (National Research Council, 2009). The 
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes recommends that digital forensic 
practitioners have a minimum of a degree in computer science or computer engineering 
(European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, 2009). The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime recommends that digital forensic practitioners should have a degree in 
information technology, computer science, mathematics, science, or electrical 
engineering (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). 
Thirty-three respondents had completed an undergraduate degree or diploma (59% of 
the sample), while 23 of the respondents had not completed an undergraduate degree 
or diploma (41% ofthe sample) . The percentages are illustrated in Figure 16 . 
. ---·- - - -----
Figure 16 ·Undergraduate Qualifications 
While 59% of the sample had completed an undergraduate degree or diploma, only 34% 
had passed matric with a university exemption, which would normally allow them to 
register to study for a university qualification. However universities do allow mature 
entry based on age, and not all of the old Technikons required a university exempt ion to 
register for a National Diploma. Twenty of the respondents had actually studied 
National Diplomas. 
59 I Page 
A breakdown of the undergraduate qualifications of those members of the sample who 
had completed undergraduate qualifications is given in Table 10. 
Table 10 - Undergraduate Qualifications 
Undergraduate Qualification Number of Respondents 
National Diploma (Information Technology) 14 
National Diploma (Policing) 6 
BCom (Information Systems) 3 
BSc (Computer Science) 5 
BTech (Policing) 1 
BTech (Forensic Investigation) 1 
BTech (Information Technology) 3 
BCom (Forensic Accounting) 1 
BCom (Accounting) 1 
National Diploma in Datametrics 1 
BEng (Civil Engineering) 1 
Diploma in Criminal Justice and Forensic Investigation 1 
The various undergraduate qualifications were then grouped into specific categories as 
illustrated in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17- Undergraduate Qualifications by Category 
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It should be noted that a few respondents had more than one undergraduate 
qualification and these are shown separately in Figure 17. Next the respondents were 
grouped into three categories: those with a qualificat ion recommended by the National 
Academy of Science or the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, or the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; those with other undergraduate 
qualifications; and those with no undergraduate qualifications. As shown in Figure 18, 
23 respondents {41% of the sample) had no undergraduate qualifications, nine 
respondents {16% ofthe sample) had an undergraduate qualification not recommended 
for digital forensics, and 24 respondents {43% of the sample) had an undergrad uate 
degree in the subject areas recommended for the practice of digital forensics. 
Of the 24 respondents with an undergraduate qualification in one of the fie lds 
recommended, only five have a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science, which 
is one of the specific qualifications recommended for digital forensics, while the others 
have a combination of other ICT qualifications, mostly National Diplomas. 
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Figure 18 - Undergraduate Qualification Breakdown by Recommended Field 
In general, computer science as an undergraduate degree is recommended in the field 
of digital forensics, as it provides the necessary scientific foundations in the field of 
computing upon which the practice of digital forensics is based. In essence, computing 
or computer science is the foundation science for the specialised forensic science of 
digital forensics. 
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Not only is computer science a key foundation, a key aspect of computer science 
graduates is the fact that they never stop learning and continue to be deeply engaged in 
the learning process post completion of their initial degree in computer science. This is 
mostly by necessity, because the field of computing is far broader and deeper than that 
for which any formal education could prepare them and owing to the constantly 
changing and expanding computing environment (Brennan, 2013). 
5.2.3. Postgraduate Education 
Sixteen respondents had completed a postgraduate degree or diploma (29% of the 
sample), while 40 respondents had not completed a postgraduate degree or diploma 
(71% of the sample) . The percentages are illustrated in Figure 19. 
Figure 19 - Postgraduate Qualifications 
A breakdown of the postgraduate qualifications is given in Table 11. 
Yes 
No 
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Table 11- Postgraduate Qualifications 
Postgraduate Qualification Number of Respondents 
BScHons (Computer Science) 2 
BComHons {Information Systems) 10 
MTech {Information Technology) 2 
PhD {Information Systems) 1 
HDip (Accounting) 1 
HDip (Taxation) 1 
BComHons (Forensic Accounting) 1 
The various postgraduate qualifications were then grouped into specific categories as 
illustrated in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20- Postgraduate Qualifications by Category 
Note that one respondent had more than one postgraduate qualification. Next we 
grouped the respondents according to their postgraduate qualifications into the 
following three categories: those with a postgraduate qualification recommended by 
the National Academy of Science, or the European Network of Forensic Science 
Institutes, or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; those with other 
postgraduate qualifications; and those with no postgraduate qualifications. As shown in 
Figure 21, 40 respondents {72% of the sample) have no postgraduate qua lifications, 
three respondents (5% of the sample) has a postgraduate qualification that is not 
recommended for digital forensics, and 13 respondents {23% of the sample) have a 
postgraduate degree that is at least in the subject areas recommended for the practice 
of d igital forensics. 
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Figure 21 - Postgraduate Qualification Breakdown by Recommended Field 
In South Africa, three tertiary academic institutions currently offer postgraduate taught 
modules in digital forensics. UP offers an Honours level module in Digital Forensics and 
Investigations as part of the BScHons Computer Science program (University of Pretoria, 
2013), the University of Johannesburg offers and Honours level module in Computer 
Forensics as part of the BScHons Computer Science Program (University of 
Johannesburg 2013), while the University of Cape Town (UCT) also offers an Honours 
level module in Computer Forensics as part of the Postgraduate Diploma and 
BComHons degree in Information Systems (University of Cape Town, 2013). 
Eleven of the respondents with a postgraduate diploma or degree had completed a 
taught module in digital forensics. Ten respondents had completed the Computer 
Forensics module at UCT, and one had completed the Digital Forensics and 
Investigations module at UP. 
The prerequisites for registration for UCT course are a three year undergraduate degree 
in computer science or information systems and at least three years relevant 
commercial experience; a degree or NQF4 level 7 diploma in another field and at least 
three years commercial experience with some IT exposure; or a minimum of five years 
relevant high-quality full time IT work experience (University of Cape Town, 2013). 
4 NQF (National Qualifications Framework) is the framework used in South Africa which groups all education 
and tra ining activity into specific levels. An NQF level 7 diploma is considered the equivalent of a Bachelor's 
degree in this framework. 
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The prerequisites for registration for the UP course are a BSc degree in Computer 
Science (or equivalent) with an average of 60% in all of the third-year computer science 
modules (University of Pretoria, 2013). 
Figure 22 shows the previous academic qualifications of those respondents who had 
completed the respective postgraduate degrees from either UCT or UP. 
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Figure 22 - UCT and UP Digital Forensics Graduates UndPrgraduate Profile 
Nine of the respondents who obtained the UCT qualification had no undergraduate 
qualification in any of the fields recommended by the National Academy of Science, the 
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, or the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, while seven had no undergraduate qualification at all. The researcher is of 
the opinion that this is a cause for some concern, as while the UCT qualification teaches 
digital forensic fundamentals, students do not have the necessary computer science 
fundamentals from an appropriate undergraduate degree. Digital forensics is seen as a 
specialisation of computer science, and having a student complete a postgraduate 
degree in digital forensics without the appropriate academic foundation would be 
similar to allowing a student to study an advanced medical specialisation such as 
neurosurgery, without them having ever studied medicine or surgery. 
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5.3. DIGITAL FORENSIC EXPERIENCE 
Four respondents had less than one year's experience as a digital forensic practitioner 
(7% of the sample), one respondent had between one and two years' experience as a 
digital forensic practitioner (2% of the sample), 17 respondents had between three and 
five years' experience as a digital forensic practitioner (30% of the sample), 17 
respondents had between six and ten years' experience (30% of the sample), 15 
respondents had between eleven and fifteen years' experience (27% of the sample), 
and two respondents had more than fifteen years' experience (4% of the sample) . 
These percentages are illustrated in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23- Digital Forensics Experience 
Twenty-three respondents had worked as digital forensic practitioners in a government 
law enforcement, intelligence, or military agency (41% of the sample); four respondents 
had worked in other government agencies (7% of the sample); 40 respondents had 
worked for private organisations that provided digital forensic services to other 
organisations (71% of the sample); and 13 respondents had worked for private 
organisations providing digital forensic services within their own organisations on ly 
(23% ofthe sample). This experience is illustrated in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24- Digital Forensics Experience per Sector 
Twenty-five respondents had testified in a court of law in their capacity as digital 
forensic practitioners (45% of the sample), while 31 respondents had not testified in 
court (55% of the sample). The percentages are illustrated in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 - Testified as Digital Forensic Practitioners in Court 
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The respondents that had stated that they had testified in court in their capacity as a 
digital forensic practitioner had testified in a variety of courts as illustrated in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26- Respondent Testifying Experience per Court 
Only four of the respondents had been questioned during cross examination in court as 
to whether the forensic imaging software or hardware, or hardware or software write 
blockers had been tested or validated, whereas 21respondents had never been asked 
th is during cross examination (see Figure 27}. 
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Figure 27- Cross Examination about Validity 
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All of the four respondents who had been questioned as to whether the hardware or 
software they had used in the forensic acquisition process had been tested and 
validated as functioning correctly, stated that the hardware or software used had been 
tested. 
All of these respondents had stated in the survey that they only make use of write 
blockers and forensic imaging tools that have been validated. Three respondents stated 
that they tested their own write blockers and forensic imaging tools, while one stated 
that the write blockers and forensic imaging tools were tested by others. 
Only one of the respondents that tested their own write blockers made use of a method 
that was a valid write blocking testing method. All three of the respondents that tested 
their own forensic imaging tools made use of a valid testing method for forensic 
imaging. All three (3) of the respondents stated that they documented their write 
blocker and forensic imaging tool test. 
The one respondent that stated that reliance was placed on write blockers and forensic 
imaging tools tested by others, confirmed that this was established as a result of 
validation documents prepared by an independent testing body and those prepared by 
the respective vendors. 
None of these respondents had been asked to prove or verify their assertions in court 
that their tools had been validated, and no test documents or reports were submitted 
as evidence to verify their statements. 
It can be argued that digital forensic science has its own intrinsic quality metric, namely, 
the evidence admitted into court and which stands up to vigorous cross examination 
(Jones & Valli, 2009). Quality assurance can, however, increase the likelihood that the 
evidence and the processes applied to it can successfully stand up to this vigorous cross 
examination. This is all good and well, but the key for this to be valid is that the digital 
forensic practitioners must in fact testify, and be subjected to vigorous cross 
examination in court. 
Thirty-one respondents had not testified in court in their capacity as digital forensic 
practitioners and this is cause for concern as their findings and work were not subjected 
to the cross-examination process in court testing the credibility and reliability of their 
findings. 
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Considering that 21 respondents had testified, but never been cross examined about 
the validity of their write blocker or forensic imaging tools, the validity of write blockers 
and forensic imaging tools of 52 respondents (93% of the sample) had never been 
challenged in court, as illustrated in Figure 28. 
This in itself is of significant concern, as these tools are a crucial component of 
preserving the digital evidence that is used in court. If the reliability of these tools is not 
challenged, there is a risk that digital evidence that should not be considered legally 
reliable may be relied upon in court, which could unfairly prejudice one side in the legal 
proceedings. In the experience of the researcher, in cases such as exceeding the speed 
limit when driving, or driving under the influence of alcohol, it is routine in court for the 
validity of the tools used to collect the evidence to be tested through cross-
examination. Thus, it is concerning that the same principle is not being followed with 
regard to the forensic acquisition of digital evidence. 
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Figure 28 - Validity of Tools Challenged in Court 
It is, however, also concerning that while seven percent of the sample was questioned 
about the validity of their tools in court, none was actually asked to provide proof of 
this . In the experience of the researcher where speed cameras and breathalysers are 
used to obtain evidence for use in court, it is routine for the calibration certificates or 
other validation documents to be submitted to the court to prove that the resu lts 
obtained were in fact valid due to the tools working correctly. It is concerning that the 
same is not done for digital evidence. 
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Based on an examination of the data, it is suggested that testifying in court is not 
currently an effective method for determining whether write blockers or forensic 
imaging tools have been validated. However, further research is needed to determine 
why legal practitioners are not challenging or testing the validity of the tools used in 
digital forensics, while they routinely do so in more common forensic disciplines. 
5.4. DIGITAL FORENSICS TRAINING 
As has been established by the literature, the training of digital forensic practitioners in 
the field of digital forensics is crucial and a key determinant of quality. It is thus 
important to understand the training that digital forensic practitioners in South Africa 
have received. Before a digital forensic practitioner (or any forensic science practitioner 
for that matter) examines and analyses any evidence, they should have the basic 
scientific education in the form of an appropriate Bachelor's degree, as well as discipline 
specific training (National Research Council, 2009). 
Forty respondents had received some form of formal digital forensics training {71% of 
the sampleL while 16 respondents had not received any formal digital forensics training 
{29% of the sample). The percentages are illustrated in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29 - Formal Digital Forensics Training 
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It is concerning that 29% of the sample, almost a third, had received no formal training 
in the field of digital forensics. 
Digital forensics training was classified in two categories. The first category related to 
vendor training, which is digital forensics training provided by vendors of specific 
hardware or software tools used in digital forensics, and focuses on the use of those 
tools in digital forensics. The second category of digital forensics training was vendor 
neutral training. Vendor neutral training is training that is provided by organisations 
other than vendors of specific hardware or software tools used in digital forensics, which 
focuses on the practice of digital forensics. 
Thirty-six respondents had attended vendor training courses, while 21 respondents had 
attended a vendor neutral training course. This is illustrated in relation to those 
respondents that had received no formal digital forensics training in Figure 30, which 
clearly shows the dominance of vendor training in the sample. 
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Figure 30 - Types of Training 
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The specific vendor courses that members of the sample had attended, and how many 
had attended each course are reflected in Table 12. 
Table 12 - Vendor Courses At tended 
Training Course Number of Respondents 
EnCase Computer Forensics I 23 
EnCase Computer Forensics II 21 
EnCase Advanced Computer Forensics 11 
Accessdata Bootcamp 19 
Accessdata Forensics 15 
Accessdata Windows XP Forensics 2 
Accessdata Windows 7 Forensics 1 
Accessdata Windows Registry Forensics 1 
Accessdata Internet Forensics 2 
Accessdata Mac Forensics 1 
Accessdata Applied Decryption 1 
The vendor courses attended reflect the courses available in South Africa that are 
offered by the vendors of the two most common digital forensic suites used in South 
Africa, namely EnCase and FTK. 
Another important element in ensuring digital forensic quality is that the competency of 
digital forensic practitioners must not be limited only to training in the use of specific 
forensic tools (Philipp, Cowen, & Davis, 2010). Digital forensics training has been 
dominated by vendor specific training, which is little more than training on how to use 
specific tools, but this does little to develop the overall skills and competencies of a 
digital forensics practitioner owing to the often narrow product specific curriculum 
(Valli, 2006). 
The specific vendor neutral courses that members of the sample had attended, and how 
many had attended each course are reflected in Table 13. 
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Table 13 • Non-Vendor Courses Attended 
Training Course Number of Respondents 
EC Council Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator 3 
SANS408 Windows Forensics In-Depth 15 
SANS508 Advanced Incident Response 1 
SANS610 Malware Analysis 1 
Ernst and Young Computer Forensics 2 
KPMG Computer Forensics 1 
GDN (French Police) Computer Forensics 1 
FLETC Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist 1 
5.5. VALIDATION TRAINING 
Five respondents stated that they had received training on the importance of val idation 
testing of the hardware and software used in the digital forensics process (9% of the 
sample), while 51 respondents had not (91% of the sample). The percentages are 
illustrated in Figure 31. 
Figure 31 - Training on Importance of Validation 
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One respondent stated that the importance of validation testing was covered in the 
EnCase Computer Forensics I course, and that this covered the necessity for validation 
and various validation processes. Three respondents stated that the importance of 
validation testing was covered in the SANS408 Windows Forensics In-Depth course, and 
that this covered the importance of validating the tools used in digital forensics. One 
respondent stated that the importance of validation testing was covered in the FLETC 
Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist course, and that this covered the 
necessity for validation and various validation processes, and how t he results should be 
documented. 
One respondent stated that he had received training in how to conduct validation 
testing of the hardware and software used in the digital forensic process (2% of the 
sample), while 55 respondents had not (98% of the sample) . The percentages are 
illustrated in Figure 32. 
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The respondent who had received training in how to conduct validation testing had been 
taught this on the FLETC Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist course, which 
taught validation methods that complied with the SWGDE standards. 
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The EnCase Computer Forensics I course syllabus does not specifically mention that it 
addresses the importance of validation testing5 , while the SANS408 Windows Forensics 
In-Depth course syllabus does address the importance of validation testing6 . The FLETC 
Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist course syllabus specifically addresses the 
importance of validation testing7 , as well as how to conduct this type of testing. 
While three respondents stated correctly that they had received training in the 
importance of validation testing as part of the SANS408 Windows Forensics In-Depth 
course, 15 respondents stated that they had attended this course, meaning that 12 did 
not recall that the course covered the importance of validation testing. 
What is of significant concern is that only one respondent had actually been formally 
trained to conduct validation testing, and that this respondent received the training in 
the United States of America. 
5.6. KNOWLEDGE OF VALIDATION STANDARDS 
The literature review identified three specific formal validation standards used in the 
field of digital forensics. The respondents were questioned to determine how they rated 
their knowledge ofthese standards. The responses are illustrated in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33 - Knowledge of Validation Standards 
5 http:/ lwww .guidancesoftwa re.coml resourcesiDocumentsiDoc-Library-PDFsiEnCase_ CFl_ v7 _Syllabus. pdf 
6 http: I I digital-fore ns i cs.sa ns.o rgltra in i ngl co u rsel computer-forensic-in vestigati ons-wi n dows-i n-de pth 
7 http:llwww.fletc.govltraining/programsltechnical-operations-divisionlseized-computer-evidence-recovery-
specialist-scers/ 
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The graph suggests that the majority of the respondents are not in a position to apply 
these formal validation standa rds used in the field of digital forensics, as very few 
understand the various standards, either generally or in detail. 
5.7. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE USED IN THE FORENSIC ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The respondents made use of various write blocker and forensic imaging tools, and in 
most instances made use of more than one type oftool. 
The write blocking tools used by the respondents are indicated in Figu re 34, which 
suggests that the most common write blockers are the Tableau Hardware Write 
Blockers8, followed by the use of Linux based software write blocker environments such 
as Helix9 and Raptor10• 
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Figure 34 - Write Blocking Tools Used 
The imaging tools used by the respondents are indicated in Figure 35, which suggests 
that the most common forensic imaging tools are FTK lmager11, followed by EnCase 
lmager12, and then various hardware imaging tools. 
8 https:/ /www .gu idancesoftware.com/products/Pages/tableau/ overview .aspx 
9 http:/ /www.e-fense.com/products.php 
10 https://www.forensicsandediscovery.com/Pages/Raptor.aspx 
11 http:/ /accessdata.com/product-download 
12 h ttps :/ fwww .gu ida ncesoftwa re. com/ products/Pages/Product -Fo rms/Foren sic-1m age r -download .as px 
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Figure 35 - Forensic Imaging Tools Used 
5.8. THE USE AND VALIDATION OF WRITE BLOCKERS 
Forty-two respondents stated that they only made use of write blockers that had been 
validated as working correctly (75% of the sample), while 14 did not always use write 
blockers that had been validated as working correctly (25% of the sample). The 
percentages are illustrated in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36 - Use of Validated Write Blockers only 
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5.8.1. 
Eighteen respondents stated that they conducted validation tests of the write blockers 
they used. Twenty-four respondents did not conduct the validation tests themselves, 
but relied on other methods to establish that the write blockers they used were 
validated. These figures, as well as the number of respondents that did not make use of 
validated write blockers are illustrated in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37 - Ensuring Write Blocker Va lidity 
Using Write Blockers That Had Not Been Validated 
The 14 respondents who did not always make use of validated write blockers gave a 
variety of reasons for not doing so: 
• There was no compelling case law or legislation that required them to only use 
validated write blockers. 
• They had never been challenged in court on this matter, and that until they had 
been, they would not worry about it. 
• They did not have the time to validate write blockers. 
• There was no protocol in place in their work environment compelling them to 
use validated write blockers. 
• They were not trained in how to validate write blockers. 
• They were not aware of the necessity of using validated write blockers. 
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5.8.2. 
The reasons provided by the respondents are quantified in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38 - Reasons for Not Using Validated Write Blockers 
One of these respondents who stated that he did not always use validated write 
blockers had received training in the importance of using validated tools on the 
SANS408 Windows Forensics In-Depth course. His specific reasons for not using 
validated write blockers was simply that he did not have time to test his write blockers 
as well as that he had never yet been challenged on this in court. 
Seven of the respondents had attended vendor training courses, and three of these had 
also completed the course in computer forensics at UCT. Seven of the respondents had 
received no formal digital forensics training, but one had completed the course in 
computer forensics at UCT. 
Five of these respondents had experience testifying in court as digital forensic 
practitioners, but none had ever been cross examined about the use of validated tools. 
Ensuring That Write Blockers Used Are Validated 
The 24 respondents who only used validated write blockers, although they did not test 
them themselves, gave the following reasons why they were satisfied that the write 
blockers they used were in fact validated: 
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• There was a validation document for the write blocker that had been prepared 
by another member of the laboratory who had validated the write blocker. 
• There was a validation document for the write blocker that had been prepared 
by an independent testing body. 
• There was a validation document for the write blocker that had been prepared 
by a university or other research institution. 
• There was a validation document for the write blocker from the vendor of the 
write blocker. 
The reasons provided by the respondents are quantified in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39 - How Validation Was Done (Write Blockers) 
Twenty-four respondents relied on the belief that the various write blockers that they 
stated they used had in fact been validated by the vendors themselves, although one of 
these twenty-four also relied on a colleague, and two of these twenty-four also relied 
on validations conducted by an independent testing body. Fifteen of these respondents 
only relied on the belief that the vendors of the various write blockers that they stated 
they used had in fact been validated by the vendors themselves. 
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Six respondents stated that they used write blocker tools that had been validated by an 
independent testing body. All of the write blocking tools that were used by these 
respondents were identified, and a comprehensive search was conducted on the 
Internet to attempt to identify if any of these tools had in fact been independently 
validated as stated by the respondents. The results of this are illustrated in Table 14. 
Table 14- Independent Validation Testing (Write Blockers) 
Write Blocking Tool Type Independent 
Validation 
Testing 
Tableau Hardware Write Blocker Proprietary, Commercial Yes13 
Helix Open source No 
Rapt or Proprietary, Freeware No 
(Based on open source) 
Wiebetech Hardware Write Blocker Proprietary, Commercial Yes14 
Helix Pro Proprietary, Commercial No 
(Based on open source) 
Deft Open source No 
Caine Open source No 
FastBiock SE Proprietary, Commercial No 
Only two of the write blocker tools that were used could be confirmed to have been 
independently validated, and as such the belief by the respondents that the tools they 
used were validated by an independent testing body is inaccurate. 
Twenty-six of the respondents relied on the belief that the vendors of the various write 
blockers had validated the tools. All of the write blocking tools used by these 
respondents were identified, and a comprehensive search was conducted on the 
Internet to attempt to identify if any of these tools had in fact been vendor validated as 
stated by the respondents. The results of this investigation are illustrated in Table 15. 
13 http://www.nij.gov/pubs-sum/216981.htm 
14 http :/ /www.nij.gov/pubs-sum/214063.htm 
82 I P a g c 
Table 15- Vendor Validation Testing (Write Blockers) 
Write Blocking Tool Type Vendor 
Validation 
Testing 
Tableau Hardware Write Blocker Proprietary, Commercial Nols 
Helix Open source No 
Raptor Proprietary, Freeware (Based on No 
open source) 
Wiebetech Hardware Write Blocker Proprietary, Commercial No 
Helix Pro Proprietary, Commercial (Based No 
on open source) 
Deft Open source No 
Caine Open source No 
FastBiock SE Proprietary, Commercial No 
F-Response Proprietary, Commercial Yes16 
Voom Proprietary, Commercial No 
Win FE Proprietary, Freeware No 
Paladin Proprietary, Freeware (Based on No 
open source) 
LinEn Proprietary, Commercial No 
USB Registry Flag Proprietary, Commercial No 
Eleven of the respondents had attended vendor neutral training courses, 14 had 
attended vendor training courses, and four of these had also completed the course in 
computer forensics at UCT. Seven of the respondents had received no formal digital 
forensics training, but one had completed the course in computer forensics at UCT. 
Nine of these respondents had experience testifying in court as digital forensic 
practitioners, but only two of the respondents had been cross examined about the use 
of validated tools. 
15 While the vendor does not report their own test results, they have posted a link to the NIST CFTI validation 
test reports on their website. 
16 https:/ /www. f -res po nse.co m/ assets/ pdfs/F-Response Validation T esti ngReportAp rii2009-Fi n a 12. 0. pdf 
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5.8.3. Validating Write Blockers 
Eighteen of the respondents stated that they conducted validation tests of the write 
blockers they used. These respondents were then asked when they conducted their 
validation tests; their responses are quantified in Figure 40. 
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Figure 40 - When Write Blockers are Validated 
Only 11 of these respondents stated that they conducted validation testing before a 
particular write blocker was used to acquire digital evidence for the first time by them. 
All 18 of these respondents stated that they used software based write blockers, 
however only six of them stated that they conducted validation tests after a software 
update had been made. Three of the respondents stated that they tested only 
hardware based write blockers, despite the fact that they stated that they also used 
software based write blockers. 
Thirteen of these respondents stated that they did not conduct their validation tests in 
terms of any established validation standard, while five stated that they did. The 
standards that they stated they complied with are illustrated in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41 - Formal Standards Used for Validating Write Blockers 
The four respondents who stated that they conducted their validation testing in terms 
of the NIST CFTI standard described their testing methodology. Three of them stated 
that they tried to deliberately write data to a drive connected a write blocker, which is 
partially compliant with the NIST CFTI standard, but one simply stated that he just 
hashed the drive before and after using a write blocker to determine whether any data 
was altered on the drive, which is not compliant with the NIST CFTI standard. The one 
respondent who stated that he conducted his validation testing in terms of the ENFSI 
standard described his testing methodology as simply trying to deliberately write data 
to a drive connected a write blocker, which is only partially compliant with the ENFSI 
standard. 
The 13 respondents that stated that they did not use an existing validation standard 
were also asked to describe their methodologies used. Two specific methodologies 
were identified. Eight of these respondents simply tried to write data to the media 
while it was connected to a write blocker. The remaining five respondents simply 
calculated the hash value of the media before it was connected to a write blocker, 
imaged the media, and then recalculated the hash of the media to determine whether it 
had changed. Both these methods, while not necessarily scientifically robust, do at least 
provide a certain level of assurance in the tool functionality. 
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Eleven of the respondents who stated that they validated their write blockers stated 
that they documented their validation tests, while seven stated that they did not, as 
illustrated in Figure 42. It is however concerning that seven respondents did not 
document their tests, meaning that there was no evidence that they could produce in 
court if asked to do so, to prove that they had actually conducted validation tests . 
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Figure 42 - Val idation Test Documentation Retention (Write Blockers) 
Only one respondent stated that he had been trained in how to conduct a validation 
test, and this was training received in the United States on the Seized Computer 
Evidence Recovery Specialist course. 
Nine of these respondents had attended vendor neutral training courses, 15 had 
attended vendor training courses, while three had also completed the course in 
computer forensics at UCT and one had completed the computer forensics course at 
UP. Two of the respondents had received no formal digital forensics training. 
Eleven of these respondents had experience testifying in court as digital forensic 
practitioners, but only three of the respondents had been cross examined about the use 
of validated tools. 
5.9. THE USE AND VALIDATION OF FORENSIC IMAGING TOOLS 
Forensic imaging tools, whether or not they are hardware based tools, software based 
tools, or a combination of both, are crucial tools for making a forensically sound image 
of evidential data, and preserving it for examination and ana lysis, and finally 
presentation in court. 
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Forty-seven respondents stated that they only made use of forensic imaging hardware 
or software that had been validated as working correctly (84% of the sample), while 
nine respondents did not always use forensic imaging hardware or software that had 
been validated as working correctly (16% of the sample). The percentages are 
illustrated in the Figure 43. 
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Figure 4~ - Only Use Validated Forensic Imaging Hardware or Software 
Sixteen respondents stated that they conducted validation tests of the forensic imaging 
software or hardware they used, while (31 respondents did not conduct the validation 
tests themselves, but relied on other methods to establish that the forensic imaging 
software or hardware they used was validated. These figures as well as the number of 
respondents that did not make use of validated forensic imaging hardware or software 
are illustrated in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44 - Ensuring Forensic Imager Validation 
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5.9.1. Using Forensic Imaging Tools That Had Not Been Validated 
The nine respondents who did not always make use of validated forensic imaging tools 
gave various reasons for this: 
• They had never been challenged in court on this matter, and that until they had 
been, they would not worry about it. 
• They did not have the time to validate forensic imaging tools. 
• There was no protocol in place in their work environment compelling them to 
use validated forensic imaging tools. 
• They were not aware of the necessity of using validated forensic imaging tools. 
The reasons provided by the respondents are quantified in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45 · Reasons for Not Using Validated Forensic Imaging Hardware or Softw are 
One of the respondents who stated that he did not always use validated forensic 
imaging tools, had received training in the importance of using validated tools on the 
SANS408 Windows Forensics In-Depth course. His specific reasons for not using 
validated forensic imaging tools were simply that he did not have time to test his 
forensic imaging tools, as well as that he had never yet been challenged on this in court. 
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5.9.2. 
Three of these respondents had attended vendor training courses, and one ofthese had 
also completed the course in computer forensics at UCT. Six of these respondents had 
received no formal digital forensics training, but one had completed the course in 
computer forensics at UCT. 
One of these respondents had experience testifying in court as a digital forensic 
practitioner, but had not been cross examined about the use of validated tools. 
Ensuring That Forensic Imaging Tools Used Are Validated 
The 31 respondents who only used validated forensic imaging tools, but did not test 
them themselves, gave the following reasons why they were satisfied that the forensic 
imaging tools they used where in fact validated: 
• There was a validation document for the forensic imaging tool that had been 
prepared by another member of the laboratory who had validated the forensic 
imaging tool. 
• There was a validation document for the forensic imaging tool that had been 
prepared by an independent testing body. 
• There was a validation document for the forensic imaging tool that had been 
prepared by a university or other research institution. 
• There was a validation document for the forensic imaging tool from the vendor 
of the forensic imaging tool. 
The reasons provided by the respondents are quantified in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46 - How Validation Was Done (Forensic Imagers) 
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Twenty-eight of the respondents relied on the belief that the vendors of the various 
forensic imaging tools that they stated they used had in fact validated these tools, 
although five also relied on colleagues, one also relied on validations conducted by an 
independent testing body, and one also relied on validation conducted by a university 
or other research institution. Thus, in total 23 of these respondents relied solely on the 
belief that the vendors themselves had validated the various forensic imaging tools that 
they stated they used. 
Four respondents stated that the tools they used had been validated by an independent 
testing body. One respondent who stated that he used forensic imaging tools validated 
by an independent testing body, also stated that these tools were in fact, val idated by 
the independent testing body. All the forensic imaging tools used by these respondents 
were identified, and a comprehensive search was conducted on the Internet to attempt 
to identify if any of these tools had in fact been independently validated as stated by 
the respondents. The results of this survey are listed in Table 16. 
Table 16- Independent Validation Testing (Forensic Imagers) 
Forensic Imaging Tool Type Independent 
Validation 
Testing 
EnCase Imager Proprietary, Freeware Yes17 
FTK Imager Proprietary, Freeware Yes18 
Helix Pro Proprietary, Commercial Yes 
(based on open source) 
Helix Proprietary, Freeware No 
(based on open source) 
dd (or other dd based command Open source Yes19 
line variants) 
Hardware forensic imager (e.g. Proprietary, Commercial Yes20 
Voom Hardcopy, Logicube Talon, 
etc.) 
17 https:l I cyberfetch. orgl grou psltest -results-dig ital-data-acq u isition-tool-e n case-65 
18 https:l lwww. cyberfetch. orgl gro u psi re porttest -resu lts-d igita 1-data-acq u is iti on-toolftk -imager -eli-290d eb ian 
19 h ttps :/I cyb erfetch. o rgl grou psltest -results-disk -imaging-tools-dd-gn u-fi leuti ls-4036-p rovid ed-red-hat -lin ux-
71 
20 h ttps :/I cyberfetch .org/ grou psltest -resu lts-d igita 1-d ata-acq u isition-tool-voom-h a rd copy-3 p--firmwa re-
version-2-04 
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The Auckland University of Technology Digital Forensics Research Laboratories tested a 
number of forensic imaging tools that were used by the respondents, in particular FTK 
Imager {version 2.9.0) and Helix Pro, using the NIST CFTI criteria and assertions (Cusack, 
2011). FTK Imager 2.9.0 had a pass rate of 89% while Helix Pro had a pass rate of 74% 
{Cusack, 2011), meaning that FTK Imager 2.9.0 met 89% of the NIST CFTI criteria, and 
Helix Pro 74% of the NIST CFTI criteria 
Twenty-six of the respondents relied on the belief that the vendors of the various 
forensic imagers had validated the tools, and for 23 of these respondents, this was their 
sole means of establishing validation. All the forensic imaging tools used by these 
respondents were identified, and a comprehensive search was conducted on the 
Internet to attempt to identify if any of these tools had in fact been vendor validated as 
stated by the respondents. The results of this survey are listed in Table 17. 
Table 17- Vendor Validation Testing (Forensic Imagers) 
Forensic Imaging Tool Type Vendor 
Validation 
Testing 
X-Ways Imager Proprietary, Commercial No 
EnCase Imager Proprietary, Freeware No 
FTK Imager Proprietary, Freeware No 
Helix Proprietary, Freeware {based on No 
open source) 
Helix Pro Proprietary, Commercial {based No 
on open source) 
Raptor Proprietary, Freeware {based on No 
open source) 
Paladin Proprietary, Freeware {based on No 
Open Source) 
dd {or other dd based command Open source No 
line variants) 
Hardware forensic imager {e.g. Proprietary, Commercial No 
Voom Hardcopy, Logicube Talon, 
etc.) 
Given the results of our survey, this means that all these 23 respondents believed 
incorrectly that the forensic imaging tools they used had been validated by the vendors 
of those tools. 
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5.9.3. 
Twelve of the respondents had attended vendor neutral training courses and 20 had 
attended vendor training courses, while seven and one of these, respectively, had also 
completed the course in computer forensics at UCT and UP. Eight of these respondents 
had received no formal training in digital forensics, while two of these eight had 
completed the computer forensics course at UCT. 
Thirteen respondents had experience testifying in court as digital forensic practitioners, 
but only two of these had been cross examined about the use of validated tools. 
Validating Forensic Imaging Tools 
Sixteen respondents stated that they conducted validation tests of the forensic imaging 
tools they used. These respondents were asked when their validation tests were 
conducted with their responses quantified in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47- When Forensic Imagers are Va lidated 
Only ten of these respondents stated that they conducted validation testing before a 
particular forensic imaging tool was used to acquire digita l evidence for the fi rst time by 
them. 
All 16 of these respondents stated that they used software based forensic imaging 
tools, however, only eight of them stated that they conducted va lidation tests after a 
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software update had been made. Two of the respondents stated that they tested 
hardware based imaging tools, despite the fact that both of them stated that they also 
used software based forensic imaging tools. 
Eleven of these respondents stated that they did not conduct their validation test in 
terms of any established validation standard, while five stated that they did, as 
illustrated in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48 - Forma l Standards Used for Validating Forensic Imagers 
The three respondents who stated that they conducted their validation testing in terms 
of the NIST CFTI standard described their testing methodology. All of them stated that 
they used a dual tool validation method, wh ich is not compliant with the NIST em 
standard. The one respondent who stated that he conducted his validation testing in 
terms of the ENFSI standard described his testing methodology as simply imaging a 
known test drive and confirming that the hash of the image matched that of the drive, 
which is only partially compliant with the ENFSI standard. The one respondent who 
stated that he conducted his validation testing in terms of the SWGDE standard 
described his testing methodology as simply imaging known test drives and confirming 
that the hash of the image matched that of the drives, which is only partially compliant 
with the SWGDE standard. 
The 11 respondents who stated that they did not use an existing validation standard 
were also asked to describe their methodologies used. Two specific methodologies 
were identified. Six of these respondents simply imaged the same media using two 
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different forensic imaging tools to determine if the images obtained matched each 
other. The remaining five respondents simply made use of the hashing functionality of 
the forensic imaging tools to test the hash values of the media being imaged before 
acquisition, and then compared the hash values of the image to see whether they 
matched. Both of these methods, while not necessarily scientifically robust, do at least 
provide a certain level of assurance of a tool's functionality. 
Ten of these respondents stated that they documented their validation tests, while six 
stated that they did not, as illustrated in Figure 49. It is however, concerning that six 
respondents did not document their tests, meaning that there was no evidence that 
they could produce in court if asked to do so to prove that they had actually conducted 
validation tests. 
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Figure 49- Validation Test Documentation Retention (Forensic Imagers) 
Only one respondent stated that he had been trained in how to conduct a validation 
test while attending the Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist course in the 
United States. 
Eight of the respondents had attended vendor neutral training courses, 13 had attended 
vendor training courses, and one had also completed the course in computer forensics 
at UCT. Two of the respondents had received no forma l digital forensics training. 
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Ten of these respondents had experience testifying in court as digital forensic 
practitioners, but only three had been cross examined about the use of validated tools. 
5.10. SUMMARY 
The analysis of the data from the respondents identified significant concerns with 
regards hardware and/or software using the forensic acquisition of digital evidence. In 
general the validity of both write-blockers and imagers could not be objectively proven. 
A number of potential contributing factors were identified which included a lack of 
training, lack of experience, lack of knowledge or standards (including validation 
practices), and the manner in which legal practitioners introduce and challenge digital 
evidence in court. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Having completed our research we are able to draw specific inferences supported by 
the research data. Using these inferences, recommendations are made for further 
research. 
6.1. THE USE OF VALIDATED FORENSIC ACQUISITION TOOLS 
The core hypothesis of this study was that digita l forensic practitioners in South Africa 
make use of hardware and/or software tools for the forensic acquisition of digital 
evidence, whose validity and/or reliability cannot be objectively proven; and as such the 
reliability of any digital evidence preserved using those tools is potentially unreliable. 
There were three specific categories of data regarding the use of validated tools. 
• Category One 
Digital forensic practitioners that did not make use of validated tools. 
• Category Two 
Digital forensic practitioners that were of the opinion that the tools they used 
were validated by another party. 
• Category Three 
Digital forensic practitioners that tested the tools they used themselves. 
With regard to Category One, 14 respondents did not make use of validated write 
blockers, while nine respondents did not make use of validated forensic imagers. This 
provided a total of 23 instances where tools used were not proven to be validated. 
With regard to Category Two, 15 respondents claimed that only the write blocker tools 
they used had been validated by the vendors of those tools, while 23 respondents 
claimed that only the forensic imaging tools they used had been validated by the 
vendors of those tools. The research could identify no instances where the tools that 
these respondents used had in fact been validated by the vendors, and as such the 
validation of these tools cannot be proven. This provides a total of 38 instances where 
the tools used were not validated. 
In addition in Category Two, nine respondents stated that the write blocker tools they 
used had been validated either by colleagues who had tested the tools (although this 
could not be verified}, or that the tools had been independently tested. Eight 
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respondents stated that the forensic imaging tools they used had been validated either 
by colleagues who had tested the tools (although this could not be verified), or that the 
tools had been independently tested. Certain of the tools used had been validated 
independently, however, this did not apply to all the tools used. It is for this reason that 
these 17 instances are considered to be inconclusive as there is no proof either way 
regarding the validation of these tools. 
With regard to Category Three, seven respondents stated that they did conduct 
validation tests of their write blockers, but these tests were not documented in any 
way. Six respondents stated that they did conduct validation tests of their forensic 
imaging tools, but these tests were not documented in any way. In the practice of 
digital forensics documentation is critical, especially when needed to prove something 
in a court of law. Without documented tests, the validation of these tools cannot be 
objectively proven in court, and as such, these 13 instances show that the tools cannot 
be proven to be validated. 
In addition in Category Three, 11 respondents conducted validation testing of their 
write blockers which was documented, while ten respondents conducted testing of 
their forensic imaging tools which was documented. However, all of the validation tests 
that were conducted, while providing a modicum of assurance of the reliability of the 
tools, fell short of providing conclusive objective proof that the tools were reliable. It is 
thus considered that these 21 instances do provide proof of validation, even though the 
weight of this proof is weak. 
Based on this, in 66% of instances, the validity and/or reliability of the tools used for the 
forensic acquisition of digital evidence cannot be proven, and in 15% of instances the 
results are inconclusive. In 19% of the instances, there is proof of validation, but this 
proof is weak. This is illustrated in Figure 50. 
97 I P a €, e 
• No Proof of Validation/No 
Validation 
Inconclusive 
Weak Proof Validation 
Figure 50 - Proof of Validation 
These results support the core hypothesis in that the majority of digital forensic 
practitioners do not use tools in the forensic acquisition of digital evidence that can be 
proven to be validated and/or reliable. While just under a fifth of digital forensic 
practitioners can provide some proof of validation and/or reliability, the proof of 
validation does not meet formal standards such as those used by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology Computer Forensic Tool Testing program, the Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence, and the European Network of Forensic Science 
Institutes. Consequently, the practices in South Africa still do not adequately address 
the validity and reliability ofthese tools in an objective and scientifically valid manner. 
In essence this means that digital evidence, which is preserved through the use of 
specific hardware and/or software tools, and is then presented and relied upon as 
evidence in a court of law, is preserved by tools where the objective and scientific 
validity thereof cannot be determined. Considering that South African courts must take 
into consideration reliability in terms of Section 15(3) of the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 in assessing the weight of digital evidence, the weight 
of digital evidence is undermined through the current state of practice in South Africa 
by digital forensic practitioners. 
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The researcher is of the opinion that digital forensic practitioners have so far managed 
to get away with these practices due to the fact that so few have actually testified in 
court (only 45% of the sample), and even fewer have been questioned about the tools 
they used (only 7% of the sample). The reasons for this have not been established, but it 
is possible that the contributing factor for this is the relative infancy of the use of digital 
evidence in South Africa court proceedings, as well as digital forensics. When one looks 
at established forensic sciences such as forensic toxicology, the validation and 
calibration of the instruments used in the forensic examination are regularly tested in 
court, and the validity and reliability thereof established through formal validation 
and/or calibration documents. 
The researcher is of the opinion that a contributing factor to the current state of 
practice in relation to forensic tools used in the forensic acquisition process is the lack 
of training in the importance of the use of validated tools, and specifically in how to 
ensure that tools are validated and how to conduct validation tests. Only 2% of the 
sample had received training on how to conduct validation tests; it should be noted that 
this specific training course is not available in South Africa . With the exception of one 
training course, the training that members of the sample had undergone was generally 
inadequate in terms of addressing validation issues. The researcher is of the opinion 
that this is an area of critical concern, as validation is one of the core areas that is 
fundamental not only to the practice of digital forensics, but forensic science in general. 
When one takes into account the lack of comprehensive training and education in the 
field of digital forensics amongst the respondents, which has contributed to the poor 
state of validation practices, then serious questions need to be raised about the general 
competency of digital forensic practitioners in other fundamental areas of digital 
forensics, and what impact this could have not only on their effectiveness, but on the 
cases that they have been involved in. 
6.2. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The research has contributed to the understanding of the current state of practice with 
regard to the use of forensic acquisition tools that are proven to be valid and/or 
reliable, and identified areas of significant concern that could negatively impact on the 
use and value of digital evidence in South African legal proceedings. 
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It has identified that the majority of digital forensic practitioners do not make use of 
validated forensic acquisition tools, and those that do use validated forensic acquisition 
tool rely on weak validation protocols. This shows that the current state of digital 
forensics practice, especially when it comes to the forensic acquisition of digita l 
evidence, is generally poor from a forensic science point of view, owing to the lack of 
validation practices, which are an important quality assurance process in forensic 
science. It has also identified the importance of training in this regard . 
6.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
A number of issues have been identified through this research, which are suggestions 
for future research. 
The first area of suggested research is the effectiveness of current digital forensics 
tra ining and education in South Africa, especially in equipping digital forensic 
practitioners with the core technical and scientific skills required in the field of digital 
forensics. The research identified areas of concern with regard to technical training and 
academic education. Does the existing available academic education and technical 
training available in South Africa actually equip a digital forensic practitioner to be a 
competent digital forensics practitioner? 
The second area of suggested research is the lack of understanding of digital forensics 
processes and procedures within the legal community, due in part to the limited 
number of instances where digital forensic practitioners have been cross-examined and 
questioned about the validity of the tools they use. If legal practitioners were more 
knowledgeable of digital forensics would they not be more vigilant in how they address 
digital evidence in court regarding its admissibility and reliability? 
100 I Page 
7. REFERENCES 
Association of Chief Police Officers. (2007} . Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based 
Electronic Evidence (2nd Edition) . London: Association of Chief Police Officers. 
Association of Chief Police Officers. (2011}. Good Practice and Advice Guide for 
Managers of e-Crime Investigation (2nd Edition). London: Association of Chief Police 
Officers. 
Barbara, J. J. (2007}. Quality Assurance Practices for Computer Forensics Part 1. Forensic 
Magazine, 4(1}, 66-69. 
Beckett, J., & Slay, J. (2007}. Digital Forensics: Validation and Verification in a Dynamic 
Work Environment. 40th Annual Hawaii lnternotional Conference on System Sciences 
(pp. 266-275}. IEEE. 
Beebe, N. L., & Clark, J. G. (2005}. A Hierarchical, Objectives-Based Framework for the 
Digital Investigations Process. Digital Investigation, 2(2), 147-167. 
Brennan, K. (2013, September). Learning Computing through Creating and Connecting. 
Computer, 46(9), 52-59. 
Britz, M. T. (2009). Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime: An Introduction (2nd Edition). 
Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
California Crime Laboratory Review Task Force. (2009} . An Examination of Forensic 
Science in California. Attorney General's Office, Department of Justice. Sacramento: 
Department of Justice. 
Carrier, B. (2003). Defining Digital Forensic Examination and Analysis Too ls Using 
Abstraction Layers. International Journal of Digital Evidence, 1(4}, 1-12. 
Carrier, B. (2005}. File System Forensic Analysis. Upper Saddle River: Addison-Wesley. 
Casey, E. (2005}. Growing Pains. Digital Investigation, 2(2}, 71-73. 
Casey, E. (2007} . What Does "Forensically Sound" Really Mean? Digital Investigation, 
4(2}, 49-50. 
Casey, E. (2011} . Digital Evidence and Computer Crime (3'd Edition). London: Academic 
Press. 
101 I Pa ge 
Casey, E., & Rose, C. W. (2010). Forensic Analysis. In E. Casey (Ed.), Handbook of Digital 
Forensics and Investigation (pp. 21-26). London: Academic Press. 
Cusack, B. (2011, February). On Trial-Imaging Tool Performance. Digital Forensics 
Magazine, (6), 11-13. 
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes. (2009). Guidelines for Best Practice in 
the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology. The Hague: European Network of 
Forensic Science Institutes. 
Fereday, M. J., & Kopp, I. (2003, April). European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 
(ENFSI) and Its Quality and Competence Assurance Efforts. Science & Justice, 43(2), 99-
103. 
Guo, Y., Slay, J., & Beckett, J. (2009). Validation and Verification of Computer Forensic 
Software Tools- Search Function. DFRWS 2009: Proceedings of the Ninth Annual DFRWS 
Conference (pp. S12-S22). Montreal: Elsevier. 
Hankins, R., Uehara, T., & Jigang, l. (2009). A Comparative Study of Forensic Science and 
Computer Forensics. Third IEEE International Conference on Secure Software Integration 
and Reliability Improvement (pp. 230-239). IEEE. 
Hanna, K. E., & Mazza, A.-M. (2006). Discussion of the Committee on Daubert Standards. 
National Research Council. Washington DC: National Academies Press. 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. (2005). Forensic Science on 
Trial. London: The Stationary Office Limited. 
Irons, A. D., Stephens, P., & Ferguson, R. I. (2009, September). Digital Investigation as a 
Distinct Discipline: A Pedagogic Perspective. Digital Investigation, 6(1-2), 82-90. 
Jones, A., & Valli, C. (2009) . Building a Digital Forensic Laboratory. Burlington: Syngress. 
Jordaan, J. (2012). A Sample of Digital Forensic Quality Assurance in the South African 
Criminal Justice System. Information Security for South Africa. Johannesburg: IEEE. 
Kenneally, E., & Brown, C. (2005) . Risk Sensitive Digital Evidence Collection. Digital 
Investigation, 2(2), 101-119, 
Kessler, G. C. (2012, December). Advancing the Science of Digital Forensics. Computer, 
45(12), 25-27. 
102 I P age 
Lyle, J. R. (2003). NIST CFTI: Testing Disk Imaging Tools. International Journal of Digital 
Evidence, 1(4). 
Lyle, J. R. (2006). A Strategy for Testing Hardware Write Block Devices. Proceedings of 
the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 2006 (pp. S3-S9). Lafayette: Elsevier. 
Lyle, J. R. (2010). If Error Rate is Such a Simple Concept, Why Don't I Have One for My 
Forensic Tool Yet? Proceedings of the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 2010 (pp. 
S135-S139). Portland: Elsevier. 
Lyle, J. R., & Wozar, M. (2007). Issues With Imaging Drives Containing Faulty Sectors. 
Proceedings of the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 2007 (pp. S13-S15). Pittsburgh: 
Elsevier. 
Marcella, A. J., & Guillossou, F. (2012). Cyber Forensics. Hoboken: Wiley. 
McKemmish, R. (2008). When is Digital Evidence Forensically Sound? In I. Ray, & S. 
Shenoi (Eds.), Advances in Digital Forensics IV (pp. 3-15). Boston: Springer. 
Meintjes-Van der Walt, L. (2012). Electronic Evidence. In S. Papadopoulos, & S. Snail 
(Eds.), Cyberlaw@SA Ill (pp. 315-332). Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
Meyers, M., & Rogers, M. (2005). Digital Forensics: Meeting the Challenges of Scientific 
Evidence. In Advances in Digital Forensics (pp. 43-50). New York: Springer. 
National Institute of Justice. (2001). Electronic Crime Scene Investigation. Washington 
DC: National Institute of Justice. 
National Institute of Justice. (2004). Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence. 
Washington DC: National Institute of Justice. 
National Institute of Justice. (2007). Digital Evidence in the Courtroom. Washington DC: 
National Institute of Justice. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2003) . Software Write Block Tool 
Specification and Test Plan. Washington DC: National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2004). Digital Data Acquisition Tool 
Specification. Washington DC: Nationallnstitite of Standards and Technology. 
103 I Page 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005) . Digital Data Acquisition Tool 
Test Assertions and Test Plan. Washington DC: National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. 
National Research Council. (2002) . The Age of Expert Testimony: Science in the 
Courtroom. Washington DC: National Academies Press. 
National Research Council. (2009). Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward. Washington DC: National Academies Press. 
Nelson, B., Phillips, A., Enfinger, F., & Steuart, C. (2008). Guide to Computer Forensics 
and Investigations (3'd Edition). Boston: Course Technology. 
Palmer, G. (2001). A Road Map for Digital Forensics Research. Utica: Digital Forensic 
Research Workshop (DFRWS) . 
Pan, L., & Batten, L. M. (2009). Robust Performance Testing for Digital Forensic Tools. 
Digital Investigation, 6(1-2), 71-81. 
Philipp, A., Cowen, D., & Davis, C. (2010) . Hacking Exposed: Computer Forensics (2nd 
Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Pollitt, M. (2008). Applying Traditional Forensic Taxonomy to Digital Forensics. In I. Ray, 
& S. Shenoi (Eds.), Advances in Digital Forensics (pp. 17-26). Boston: Springer. 
Reith, M., Carr, C., & Gunsch, G. (2002) . An Examination of Digital Forensic Models. 
International Journal of Digital Evidence, 1(3), 1-12. 
Republic of South Africa . (2002). The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
25 of 2002. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Rogers, M. K., & Seigfried, K. (2004, February). The Future of Computer Forensics: A 
Needs Analysis Approach. Computers & Security, 43(2), 12-16. 
Sammes, T., & Jenkinson, B. (2007). Forensic Computing (2nd Edition). London: Springer. 
Sansurooah, K. (2006) . Taxonomy of Computer Forensics Methodologies and 
Procedures for Digital Evidence Seizure. Proceedings of the 4th Australian Digital 
Forensics Conference (pp. 67-77). Perth: Edith Cowan University. 
104 I Page 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2009). Research Methods for Business Students 
(5th Edition). Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
Schloss, P. J., & Smith, M. (1999). Conducting Research. Upper Saddle River: Prentice 
Hall. 
Schwikkard, P. J., & Van Der Merwe, S. E. (2002). Principles of Evidence (2nd Edition). 
Cape Town: Juta. 
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence. (2009). SWGDE Recommended Guidelines 
for Validation Testing. Washington DC: Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence. 
Selamat, S. R., Yusof, R., & Sahib, S. (2008). Mapping Process of Digital Forensic 
Investigation Framework. International Journal of Computer Science and Network 
Security, 8(10), 163-169. 
Solomon, M. G., Barrett, D., & Broom, N. (2005). Computer Forensics Jump Start. 
Alameda: Sybex. 
Swanson, C. R., Chamelin, N.C., Territo, L., & Taylor, R. W. (2006). Crimina/Investigation 
(9th Edition). New York: McGraw-Hil l. 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). Staff Skill Requirements and 
Equipment Recommendations for Forensic Science Laboratories. Vienna: United Nations. 
University of Cape Town. (2013). Postgraduate Diploma in Management in Information 
Systems (CG022). INF4016W: Computer Forensics (Curriculum). Retrieved December 19, 
2013, from University of Cape Town. Faculty of Commerce. Information Systems: 
http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/lnformationSystems/Courses/inf4016w/ 
University of Johannesburg. (2013). Faculty of Science Postgraduate Courses. Retrieved 
January 2, 2015, from: 
http://www. uj.ac.za/E N/Facu lties/ science/Students/Documents/Fa c_Science _Postgrad 
uate%20Courses%20and%20Research%20Projects.pdf 
University of Pretoria. (2013) . Honours Degree. Retrieved December 19, 2013, from 
Computer Science: http://www.cs.up.ac.za/courses/COS783 
Vacca, J. R. (2005). Computer Forensics: Computer Crime Scene Investigation (2nd 
Edition) . Boston: Thomson. 
105 I Page 
Valjarevic, A., & Venter, H. S. (2012) . Harmonised Digital Forensic Investigation Model. 
Information Security for South Africa (ISSA} (pp. 1-10). IEEE. 
Valli, C. (2006). Establishing a Vendor Neutral Skills Based Framework for Digital 
Forensics Curriculum Development and Competence Assessment. Proceedings of the 
4th Australian Digital Forensics Conference (pp. 154-159). Perth: Edith Cowan 
University. 
Van Der Merwe, D., Roos, A., Pistorius, T., & Eiselen, S. (2008). Information and 
Communications Technology Law. Durban: LexisNexis. 
Volonino, L., Anzaldua, R., & Godwin, J. (2007). Computer Forensics Principles and 
Practices. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Wilsdon, T., & Slay, J. (2006). Validation of Forensic Computing Software Utilizing Black 
Box Testing Techniques. Proceedings of the 4th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 
(pp. 113-120). Perth: Edith Cowan University. 
Zatyko, K. (2007, February/March). Defining Digital Forensics. (C. Janson, Ed.) Forensic 
Magazine, 4(1), pp. 18-22. 
106 I P a g 2 
8. APPENDIX 
This appendix contains a printed version of the Internet based research questionnaire 
that was used to collect the data from the respondents. It also includes a logic diagram 
showing how skip logic was used in the design of the questionnaire to ensure that 
respondents only had to answer questions that were relevant to themselves. 
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The Validation of Evidence Acquisition Tools in Digital Forensics
The forensic acquisition of digital evidence is perhaps the most crucial part of the entire digital forensics process, and 
the use of write­blocking hardware and software, and forensic imaging hardware and software are critical tools in this 
process. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the current state of practice in South Africa in relation to the validation of 
write blockers and imaging tools used in the forensic acquisition of digital evidence, and to establish the reasons for 
the current state of practice in this area. 
 
As practicing digital forensics practitioners, you are in a unique position to assist the research in better 
understanding the current practices in this regard in South Africa, and advance the field of digital forensic science 
through your participation in this research. 
 
The research is being conducted as partial fulfilment for a MSc degree in Computer Science specialising in 
Information Security at Rhodes University. 
 
Introduction
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Researcher: Jason Jordaan 
Supervisor: Dr. Karen Bradshaw 
 
1. I have received information about this research project. 
2. I understand the purpose of this research project and my involvement in it. 
3. I understand that I may withdraw from this research project at any stage. 
4.I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified and my 
personal results will remain confidential. 
5.I understand that I will receive no payment for participating in this study. 
1. I agree to participate in this research:
 
Declaration
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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2. Would you like to receive a copy of the final research paper(s)?
 
Declaration
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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3. Please provide your e­mail address to which the research paper(s) can be sent. 
This will be kept confidential.
 
 
Declaration
*
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4. What is your gender?
5. Which category below includes your age?
6. South Africa is bound to address racial inequalities in terms of our Constitution 
and other legislation. The following question will ask you to classify yourself in terms of 
a category in terms of the Employment Equity Act so that the distribution of digital 
forensic examiners can be determined by grouping. Are you comfortable answering a 
question of this nature?
 
Demographic Data
*
*
*
 
Female
 
nmlkj
Male
 
nmlkj
17 or younger
 
nmlkj
18­20
 
nmlkj
21­29
 
nmlkj
30­39
 
nmlkj
40­49
 
nmlkj
50­59
 
nmlkj
60 or older
 
nmlkj
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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7. In which Employment Equity group are you?
 
Demographic Data
*
 
Black
 
nmlkj
White
 
nmlkj
Coloured
 
nmlkj
Indian
 
nmlkj
Asian
 
nmlkj
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8. Have you completed matric?
 
Secondary Education
*
 
Yes, without University Exemption
 
nmlkj
Yes, with University Exemption
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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9. Did you have mathematics (not maths literacy) as a subject in matric?
10. Did you have physical science as a subject in matric?
11. Did you have information technology (or a similar subject) as a subject in matric?
 
Secondary Education
*
*
*
 
Yes, I passed it in matric
 
nmlkj
Yes, I failed it in matric
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
Yes, I passed it in matric
 
nmlkj
Yes, I failed it in matric
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
Yes, I passed it in matric
 
nmlkj
Yes, I failed it in matric
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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12. Have you completed an undergraduate degree or diploma?
 
Tertiary Education
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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13. Which undergraduate degrees or diplomas have you completed?
14. Have you completed a postgraduate degree?
 
Tertiary Education
*
*
 
National Diploma (Information Technology)
 
gfedc
National Diploma (Policing)
 
gfedc
BCom (Information Systems)
 
gfedc
BSc (Computer Science)
 
gfedc
BSc (Information Systems)
 
gfedc
BSc (Computer Science and Information Systems)
 
gfedc
BSc/BEng (Electronic Engineering)
 
gfedc
BSc/BEng (Computer Engineering)
 
gfedc
BSc/BEng (Software Engineering)
 
gfedc
LLB
 
gfedc
BProc
 
gfedc
BTech (Policing)
 
gfedc
BTech (Forensic Investigation)
 
gfedc
BTech (Information Technology)
 
gfedc
Other (please specify)
 
 
gfedc
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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15. Which postgraduate degree(s) have you completed?
16. Have you studied a module in digital or computer forensics as part of your 
postgraduate studies?
 
Tertiary Education
*
*
 
BScHons (Computer Science)
 
gfedc
BScHons (Information Systems)
 
gfedc
BComHons (Information Systems)
 
gfedc
MSc (Computer Science)
 
gfedc
MSc (Information Systems)
 
gfedc
MCom (Information Systems)
 
gfedc
MTech (Information Technology)
 
gfedc
MSc/MEng (Computer Engineering)
 
gfedc
MSc/MEng (Software Engineering)
 
gfedc
MSc/MEng (Electronic Engineering)
 
gfedc
MTech (Policing)
 
gfedc
MTech (Forensic Investigation)
 
gfedc
LLM
 
gfedc
PhD
 
gfedc
D Litt et Phil
 
gfedc
LLD
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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17. Which of the following modules in digital forensics have you completed?
 
Tertiary Education
*
 
Computer Forensics (part of BComHons/PGDip in Information Systems at the University of Cape Town)
 
gfedc
Computer Forensics (part of BScHons in Computer Science at the University of Pretoria)
 
gfedc
Computer Forensics (part of BScHons in Computer Science at the University of Johannesburg)
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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18. In which industries have you practiced digital forensics?
19. In which industry do you currently practice digital forensics?
20. In which province are you currently based?
21. How many total years experience do you have as a digital forensic practitioner?
 
Digital Forensics Work Experience
*
*
*
Private Sector (Digital Forensics Service Provider to External Clients)
 
gfedc
Public Sector (SAPS, DPCI, SIU, SARS, SSA, Military)
 
gfedc
Public Sector (Other)
 
gfedc
Private Sector (In­House Digital Forensics)
 
gfedc
Private Sector (In­House Digital Forensics)
 
nmlkj
Public Sector (SAPS, DPCI, SIU, SARS, SSA, Military)
 
nmlkj
Private Sector (Digital Forensics Service Provider to External Clients)
 
nmlkj
Public Sector (Other)
 
nmlkj
Eastern Cape
 
nmlkj
Western Cape
 
nmlkj
Free State
 
nmlkj
KwaZulu Natal
 
nmlkj
Northern Cape
 
nmlkj
Gauteng
 
nmlkj
North West
 
nmlkj
Limpopo
 
nmlkj
Mpumalanga
 
nmlkj
Less than 1 year
 
nmlkj
1­2 years
 
nmlkj
2­5 years
 
nmlkj
5­10 years
 
nmlkj
10­15 years
 
nmlkj
More than 15 years
 
nmlkj
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22. How would you rate your competencies in following areas of digital forensics 
practice?
23. Have you testified as a digital forensics practitioner in a court?
*
Poor Below Average Average Above Average Good
Cyber Law nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Law of Evidence nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Criminal and Civil 
Procedure Law
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Acquisition of Digital 
Evidence
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Examination of Digital 
Evidence
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Analysis of Digital 
Evidence
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Drafting Forensic 
Reports/Affidavits
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Testifying nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General Forensic Science nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General Computer 
Science
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General Electronic 
Engineerings
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General 
Telecommunications
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General Mathematics nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General Statistics nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
General Investigations 
and Criminalistics
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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24. In which courts have you had experience testifying as a digital forensics 
practitioner? Select all that apply.
25. During cross­examination, have you ever been questioned about whether or not 
your forensic imaging software/hardware, or hardware/software write­blockers have 
been tested or validated that they are working correctly?
 
Testifying
*
*
 
Constitutional Court
 
gfedc
Supreme Court of Appeals
 
gfedc
High Court (Criminal)
 
gfedc
High Court (Civil)
 
gfedc
Labour Court
 
gfedc
Regional Court
 
gfedc
Magistrates Court
 
gfedc
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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26. As a follow­up to the previous question, please describe what happened during 
cross­examination, and what the consequences were.
 
 
Testifying
*
5
6
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27. Have you received any formal training in the field of digital forensics?
 
Digital Forensics Training
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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28. Have you attended any vendor specific training courses?  
A vendor specific training course is one provided by a digital forensic software or 
hardware vendor and focuses on the use of the vendor's products in digital forensics.
 
Vender Training
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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29. Indicate all vendor specific training courses that you have attended. Select all that 
apply.
 
Vender Training
*
 
EnCase Computer Forensics I
 
gfedc
EnCase Computer Forensics II
 
gfedc
EnCase Advanced Computer Forensics
 
gfedc
AccessData Bootcamp
 
gfedc
AccessData Forensics
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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30. Have you attended any vendor neutral digital forensics training courses? 
A vendor neutral digital forensics training course is a course that focuses on digital 
forensics principles, processes, and methods, without focusing on specific tools.
 
Vender Neutral Training
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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31. Indicate all vendor neutral training courses that you have attended.
 
Vender Neutral Training
*
 
EC­Council Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator
 
gfedc
SANS 408 Windows Forensics
 
gfedc
SANS 508 Advanced Incident Response
 
gfedc
IACIS Basic Computer Forensic Examination
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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32. Have you received any training on the importance of validation testing of the 
hardware and software used in the digital forensic process?
 
Validation Training
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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33. Which training courses that you attended covered the importance of validation 
testing?
 
34. What specifically did they cover in relation to validation?
 
35. Have you received any training on how to conduct validation testing of the 
hardware and software used in the digital forensic process?
 
Validation Training
5
6
*
5
6
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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36. Which training courses that you attended covered how to conduct validation 
testing?
 
37. How did they teach you to conduct validation testing?
 
 
Validation Training
*
5
6
*
5
6
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38. How would you rate your knowledge of the following validation standards as they 
are applied in the science of digital forensics?
 
Validation Standards
*
I do not know anything 
about this standard
I have heard about 
this standard
I have read this 
standard
I understand most of 
this standard
I understand this 
standard in detail
NIST CFTT nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
IACIS nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
ENFSI nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
SWGDE nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
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39. Select all of the write­blocking tools or methods that you make use of.
 
Write­Blocking Methods and Tools
*
 
WinFE
 
gfedc
Helix
 
gfedc
Helix Pro
 
gfedc
Raptor
 
gfedc
Paladin
 
gfedc
Deft
 
gfedc
Caine
 
gfedc
F­Response
 
gfedc
Tableau Hardware Write­Blockers
 
gfedc
Wiebetech Hardware Write­Blockers
 
gfedc
Other(s) (please specify) 
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40. Select all of the forensic imaging tools that you use.
 
Forensic Imaging Methods Used
*
 
Hardware forensic imager (e.g. Voom Hardcopy, Logicube Talon etc)
 
gfedc
dd (or other dd based command line variants)
 
gfedc
Paladin
 
gfedc
Raptor
 
gfedc
Helix
 
gfedc
Helix Pro
 
gfedc
FTK Imager
 
gfedc
EnCase
 
gfedc
X­Ways
 
gfedc
Other(s) (please specify) 
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41. Do you only use write­blockers that have been validated?
 
Use of Write­Blockers
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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42. Do you conduct validation testing of write­blockers?
 
Validation Testing of Write­Blockers
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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43. When do you conduct validation tests on your write­blockers? Select all that 
apply.
44. Do you conduct your validation testing of write­blockers using a published 
standard?
 
Validation Testing of Write­Blockers
*
*
 
Before it is used in a forensic acquisition environment
 
gfedc
As soon as there has been a firmware update (hardware write­blockers)
 
gfedc
As soon as there has been a software update
 
gfedc
As soon as there has been an error or problem identified
 
gfedc
On a regular scheduled basis (hardware write­blockers)
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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45. Which validation standards and methodologies do you comply with when 
conducting validation tests of write­blockers? Select all that apply.
46. How do you test your write­blockers?
 
47. Are your write­blocker validation tests documented?
 
Validation Testing of Write­Blockers
*
*
5
6
*
 
NIST CFTT
 
gfedc
IACIS
 
gfedc
ENFSI
 
gfedc
SWGDE
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
Page 32
The Validation of Evidence Acquisition Tools in Digital Forensics
48. How long do you keep these validation test documents?
 
Validation Testing of Write­Blockers
*
 
Less than 1 year
 
nmlkj
1­2 years
 
nmlkj
2­5 years
 
nmlkj
Longer than 5 years
 
nmlkj
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49. How do you know that the write­blockers that you use are validated? Select all 
that apply.
 
Proof of Validation
*
 
There is a validation document for the write­blocker that has been prepared by another member of the laboratory who has validated 
the write blocker 
gfedc
There is a validation document for the write­blocker that has been prepared by an independent testing body
 
gfedc
There is a validation document for the write­blocker that has been prepared by a university or other research institution
 
gfedc
There is a validation document from the vendor
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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50. Why do you not make use of validated write­blockers? Please select all that apply.
 
Reasons for Using Non­Validated Write­Blockers
*
 
It is not necessary to use validated write blockers
 
gfedc
There is no compelling case law or legislation that requires me to do so
 
gfedc
I have never been challenged in court on this matter so until I am, I do not do this
 
gfedc
I am not aware of the necessity of using validated write­blockers
 
gfedc
I do not have the time to validate write­blockers
 
gfedc
There is no protocol in place in my work environment compelling me to use validated write­blockers
 
gfedc
Validation testing is an expense
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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51. Do you use imaging software or hardware that has been validated?
 
Use of Imaging Tools
*
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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52. Do you conduct validation testing of imaging software or hardware?
 
Validation Testing of Imaging Hardware and Software
 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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53. When do you conduct validation tests on your imaging software or hardware? 
Select all that apply.
54. Do you conduct your validation testing of imaging hardware and/or software 
using a published standard?
 
Validation Testing of Imaging Hardware and Software
*
*
 
Before it is used in a forensic acquisition environment
 
gfedc
As soon as there has been a firmware update (hardware imagers)
 
gfedc
As soon as there has been a software update
 
gfedc
As soon as there has been an error or problem identified
 
gfedc
On a regular scheduled basis (hardware imagers)
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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55. Which validation standards and methodologies do you comply with when 
conducting validation tests of imaging hardware and software? Select all that apply.
56. How do you test your imaging hardware and/or software?
 
57. Are your imaging hardware and software validation tests documented?
 
Validation Testing of Imaging Hardware and Software
*
*
5
6
*
 
NIST CFTT
 
gfedc
IACIS
 
gfedc
ENFSI
 
gfedc
SWGDE
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
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58. How long do you keep these validation test documents?
 
Validation Testing of Imaging Hardware and Software
*
 
Less than 1 Year
 
nmlkj
1­2 Years
 
nmlkj
2­5 Years
 
nmlkj
Longer than 5 Years
 
nmlkj
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59. How do you know that the imaging hardware and software that you use are 
validated? Select all that apply.
 
Proof of Validation
*
 
There is a validation document for the imaging hardware and/or software that has been prepared by another member of the 
laboratory that has validated it 
gfedc
There is a validation document for the imaging hardware and/or software that has been prepared by an independent testing body
 
gfedc
There is a validation document for the imaging hardware and/or software that has been prepared by a university or other research 
institution 
gfedc
There is a validation document from the vendor
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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60. Why do you not make use of validated imaging hardware or software? Please 
select all that apply.
 
Reasons for Not Using Validated Imaging Hardware or Software
*
 
It is not necessary to use validated imaging tools
 
gfedc
There is no compelling case law or legislation which requires me to do so
 
gfedc
I have never been challenged in court on this matter so until I am, I do not do this
 
gfedc
I am not aware of the necessity of using validated imaging tools
 
gfedc
I do not have the time to validate imaging tools
 
gfedc
There is no protocol in place in my work environment compelling me to use validated imaging tools
 
gfedc
Validation testing is an expense
 
gfedc
Other (please specify) 
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Thank you for participating in this research survey. 
 
Thank You
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Thank you for considering this research survey, and we respect your decsion not to participate in this research. 
 
Thank You
